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ABSTRACT
Kim, Dae Wook, Ph.D.. College of Computer Science & Engineering, Wright State University,
2017. Data-Driven Network-Centric Threat Assessment.
As the Internet has grown increasingly popular as a communication and information
sharing platform, it has given rise to two major types of Internet security threats related to
two primary entities: end-users and network services. First, information leakages from
networks can reveal sensitive information about end-users. Second, end-users systems
can be compromised through attacks on network services, such as scanning-and-exploit
attacks, spamming, drive-by downloads, and fake anti-virus software. Designing threat as-
sessments to detect these threats is, therefore, of great importance, and a number of the
detection systems have been proposed. However, these existing threat assessment systems
face significant challenges in terms of i) behavioral diversity, ii) data heterogeneity, and iii)
large data volume.
To address the challenges of the two major threat types, this dissertation offers three
unique contributions. First, we built a new system to identify network users via Domain
Name System (DNS) traffic, which is one of the most important behavior-based tracking
methods for addressing privacy threats. The goal of our system is to boost the effectiveness
of existing user identification systems by designing effective fingerprint patterns based on
semantically limited DNS queries that are missed by existing tracking efforts.
Second, we built a novel system to detect fake anti-virus (AV) attacks, which repre-
sent an active trend in the distribution of Internet-based malware. Our system aims to
boost the effectiveness of existing fake AV attack detection by detecting fake AV attacks
in three challenging scenarios: i) fake AV webpages that require user interaction to install
malware, instead of using malicious content to run automatic exploitation without users
consent (e.g., shellcode); ii) fake AV webpages designed to impersonate real webpages us-
ing a few representative elements, such as the names and icons of anti-virus products from
iii
authentic anti-virus webpages; and iii) fake AV webpages that offer up-to-date solutions
(e.g., product versions and threat names) to emerging threats.
Finally, we built a novel system to detect malicious online social network (OSN) ac-
counts that participate in online promotion events. The goal of our work is to boost the ef-
fectiveness of existing detection methods, such as spammer detection and fraud detection.
To achieve our goal, our framework that systematically integrates features that characterize
malicious OSN accounts based on three of their characteristics: their general behaviors,
their recharging patterns, and their currency usage, and then leverages statistical classifier
for detection.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
The rise and popularity of the Internet as an essential part of life has ensured that Internet
services play a significant role in peoples lives [30]. According to prior surveys [73], as of
2016, the total number of Internet users worldwide is 3.5 billion, including approximately
680 million Internet users in China and 282 million in the USA. However, the rapid growth
of the social phenomenon of Internet usage has produced significant threats to Internet
security. Specifically, two primary entities end-users and network services are at risk of
cyber threats.
End-users, who are also referred to as regular Internet users, typically face two types
of major threats to Internet security. First, information leakages from the Internet threaten
the privacy of end-users. Specifically, increasing numbers of applications, such as Internet
measurements, traffic engineering, and network-based intrusion detection, require network
traffic to be preserved and analyzed. As a consequence, network users sensitive information
could be leaked. Second, end-users systems might be compromised by attackers. Attackers
frequently exploit software vulnerabilities to compromise end-users systems using a variety
of methods. These methods could include scanning-and-exploit attacks [55], spamming
[25], drive-by downloads [16], and fake anti-virus software [27].
Network services are Internet services that rely on secure infrastructures to operate.
An increasing number of network services rely specifically on social networks; in these
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cases, attackers may create accounts, perform malicious activities, and finally damage the
security of the infrastructure. For example, Tencent QQ [63], a leading Chinese OSN,
supports its own virtual currency (the Q coin) through an online financial service that links
an online banking account with a virtual currency account. Attackers might compromise
QQ accounts by participating in online promotion events and collecting the virtual currency.
Subsequently, they can use spam methods to launder the virtual currency to other users.
Assessing such threats is crucially important. However, threat assessments face three
significant challenges. First, attackers exhibit a wide diversity of behaviors, making it dif-
ficult to design static rules for threat assessment. For example, the attackers (i.e., malicious
OSN users) are likely to show three categories of distinct behaviors within OSN dataset.
These attackers behaviors cover general behavior (e.g., chatting, photo sharing), virtual-
currency collection (e.g., online banking, promotion), and virtual-currency usage (e.g., on-
line shopping, gifting). Intrinsically, each of these behaviors has different characteristics,
resulting in the need for robust and seamless threat assessment methods.
Second, addressing data heterogeneity and assessing multiple factors simultaneously
is of utmost importance. For example, fake anti-virus (AV) webpages inherently comprise
heterogeneous types of data based on user-perception content (e.g., images), search engine
optimization (e.g., URL keywords), and networking infrastructures (e.g., HTTP protocol).
Characterizing these data effectively requires the use of a variety of threat assessment tech-
niques.
Third, the volume of data involved is huge; thus, the methods used must be scalable.
For instance, data collected from the DNS resolver tend to include large volumes of DNS
traces. It is difficult to handle these large data using traditional data manipulation or sta-
tistical methods on single-host infrastructures. Instead, big data platforms (e.g., Hadoop)
must be applied to process and analyze large-scale DNS datasets for high scalability.
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1.2 Objectives and Challenges
In this dissertation, we address three important and challenging problems. First, we seek
to assess the extent to which users fingerprints can be leaked through DNS traffic. Second,
we wish to design an automated method capable of detecting fake AV distribution web-
pages. Third, we design a system to identify malicious accounts used for online promotion
behaviors in social network.
First, we are interested in the feasibility of DNS-based behavioral fingerprinting tech-
niques that rely on users DNS activities. Since DNS traces can be leaked and used to derive
fingerprints that characterize end-users DNS activities, attackers can use these traces to de-
anonymize the users in DNS traffic. This is one of the most significant privacy threats
associated with end-users. However, in order to identify users of DNS datasets accurately,
it is necessary to derive effective DNS fingerprint patterns. To tackle this problem and de-
sign DNS-based fingerprint systems, we must address three specific challenges. First, DNS
traces use few semantics and do not include explicit identifiers (i.e., only DNS queries are
visible), making it difficult to design effective fingerprint patterns. Second, users DNS ac-
tivities are diversified, thus increasing the challenge of distinguishing among users. Third,
the extremely large volume of DNS queries leads to problems related to the scalability of
the systems needed to handle the massive DNS datasets. Although some existing methods
[46, 11, 85, 84, 61] to address these problems have been proposed, they are not sufficient
to fully address these challenges.
Second, fake anti-virus (AV) attacks represent a new and active trend in the distribu-
tion of malware to end-users. According to a Google case study [65], fake AV attacks are
responsible for 50% of all malware delivered via Internet advertising, and their prevalence
is growing. Such attacks, therefore, represent a serious threat to end-users. With respect
to phishing threat assessments, the development of fake AV webpage detection systems is
an important challenge. To address this challenge, we develop a new automatic system
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that can generate detection features based on the properties of fake AV webpages and use
statistical classifiers to discriminate fake AV webpages from legitimate ones. To achieve
high levels of detection performance, the main challenge is to design systematic and robust
features using the heterogeneous data extracted from the fake AV webpages. To address
this challenge, we propose detection features characterized by the three aspects that are
most important for successful fake AV attacks. Some existing fake AV detection systems
[16, 19, 49, 66] are easily evaded by attackers due to the nature of fake AV webpages (i.e.,
data heterogeneity), and their detection abilities are significantly constrained, resulting in
an inability to effectively detect fake AV attacks.
Third, we focus on malicious OSN accounts that attackers create to launch malicious
attacks, such as spamming or phishing, to worsen the protection of OSN network services.
Specifically, malicious OSN accounts participating in online promotions represent a novel
threat to OSN network services. The attackers who control malicious OSN accounts can
illegally transfer virtual currencies collected as rewards from promotion events to other
users as gifts. The mostly important problem in addressing this threat is detecting these
malicious OSN accounts, which can enable network services to mitigate malicious activi-
ties. A number of detection systems [25, 12, 86, 1, 81, 77] have been proposed to address
such threats as OSN spamming or fraudulent activities; however, these systems have been
largely constrained by two major challenges that make it difficult for existing methods to
detect malicious OSN accounts: First, these malicious OSN accounts do not rely on any
malicious content or network infrastructure (e.g., phishing URLs, exploits), and second,
no social interaction among OSN accounts is required. As a result, it is difficult to apply
existing methods to detect malicious OSN accounts.
To summarize, existing threat assessments may fail to detect malicious threats and
identify privacy leaks in terms of behavioral diversity, data heterogeneity, and data volume
as a result of three practical challenges. Since the effectiveness of these threat assessments
is significantly limited due to an insufficient ability to detect new attacks, novel threat
4
assessments based on networks are required to address emerging challenges.
1.3 Overview of Solutions
In order to address the challenges of behavioral diversity, data heterogeneity, and data vol-
ume, we build two threat assessment systems: an automatic and scalable system to re-
identify network users in DNS traffic and an automated and effective system to detect fake
AV webpages on the Internet. Finally, we build a detection system to identify malicious
OSN accounts that participate in online promotion events.
First, we design a system [39] to re-identify end-users in a passively collected DNS
dataset, which represents a threat to users privacy. The goal of our system is to boost the
effectiveness (e.g., detection power) and scalability (e.g., time computation) of existing
user re-identification systems by designing effective patterns based on semantically lim-
ited DNS queries that are missed by existing efforts. To accomplish this goal, our system
adopts five features to systematically characterize users diverse behaviors along three dif-
ferent identifiers: their domain names, their inter-domain relationships, and their temporal
behaviors. In addition, we use the MapReduce platform to efficiently process a large vol-
ume of DNS traces (467 million DNS queries). Experimental results based on a massive
DNS dataset demonstrate that our system can identify 69.63% of users who have behavioral
fingerprints in the historical DNS stream and who experience persistent DNS activities in
the new DNS stream. Among these identifiable users, we find that our system can achieve
a high accuracy of 98.74% and a low false positive rate of 1.26%.
Second, we design a system [38] to detect fake AV software distribution webpages,
which represent a malicious threat related to end-users compromised systems. The goal
of our system is to boost the effectiveness of existing fake AV methods by detecting fake
AV attacks in three challenging scenarios: i) fake AV webpages that require users interac-
tion to install malware, instead of using malicious content to run automatic exploitations
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without users consent (e.g., shellcode); ii) fake AV webpages designed to impersonate
webpages through a few representative elements, such as the names and icons of anti-virus
products from authentic anti-virus webpages; and iii) fake AV webpages that provide up-
to-date solutions (e.g., product versions and threat names) to emerging threats. To fulfill
our goals, our system first collects fake AV webpages, which are labeled by public domain
reputation services (e.g., MalewareDomainList) and malware detection engine-based man-
ual inspection services (e.g., VirusTotal), to draw executable(s) from each webpage. Our
system further extracts three categories of detection features, including human-perception
features, SEO features, and networking features, to characterize the intrinsic elements of
fake AV webpages. Based on the features extracted from heterogeneous fake AV data, our
system then distinguishes fake AV webpages from legitimate ones using statistical classi-
fiers. Experimental results based on a real dataset of fake AV webpages demonstrates that
our system can achieve a high detection rate (90.4%) and a very low false positive rate
(0.2%).
Finally, we build a novel system [92] to detect malicious OSN accounts that participate
in online promotion events, which represent a major threat in terms of network services.
Since online social networks integrate financial capabilities by enabling the use of both real
and virtual currency, they serve as new platforms for hosting a variety of business activities,
such as online promotion events, in which users can collect virtual currency as a reward for
participating. Both OSNs and business partners are concerned about attackers using a set
of accounts to collect virtual currency from these events, thus reducing the events’ effec-
tiveness and causing significant financial loss. Therefore, it is important to proactively
detect malicious OSN accounts prior to online promotion activities and to subsequently
decrease their reward priority. The goal of our work is to boost the effectiveness of existing
detection methods, such as spammer detection and fraud detection. To achieve this goal,
we propose a new framework for systematically integrating the features that characterize
OSN accounts from three perspectives: general behaviors, recharging patterns, and cur-
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rency usage. To demonstrate the detection accuracy of our system, we perform extensive
experiments based on a real OSN dataset (the Tencent QQ dataset) with built-in financial
management activities and then ProGuard can accomplish a high detection rate of 96.67%
at very extremely low false positive of 0.3%.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we discuss the design of a new system, DNSMiner, to distinguish net-
work users from DNS traffic. We present a survey of existing DNS-based behavioral track-
ing techniques and compare them to our system. We then elaborate on the system design
of DNSMiner, including its fingerprint pattern mining and matching approaches to reveal
the presence of specific users within large-scale DNS traffic. The experimental evaluation
is also discussed in terms of its detection rate and its false positive rate.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the design of our detection system, DART, to detect fake AV
attacks. Existing methods for fake AV attacks are presented, and we introduce ways to
collect and label fake AV webpages. The proposed features and classification algorithms
used to distinguish fake AV webpages from legitimate ones are discussed. We subsequently
present our evaluation results.
In Chapter 4, we discuss ProGuard, a novel system to detect malicious accounts in
OSN-based online promotion activities. We provide a statement for a new problem and
discuss why the problem should be solved and also describe related work and limitations. In
addition, we explain our ProGuard architecture including data labelling and the detection
features design based on three aspects of malicious OSN accounts. The evaluation on
real-world OSN dataset is presented, followed by the detection performance and feature
importance and their correlation.
In Chapter 5, we summarize our contributions and discuss potential future work, as
7
well as closing remarks.
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Chapter 2: Detecting Users’ Identities in
DNS Traffic
2.1 Motivation
The analysis of Domain Name System (DNS) data plays an important role in a variety of
applications such as traffic engineering [69, 80], malicious domain detection [33, 6, 8, 5],
and cover-channel analysis [62]. While the demand for DNS traces is generally increas-
ing, the collected DNS traces may introduce significant privacy concerns. For example,
DNS queries that are triggered by the prefetching mechanisms of popular browsers can
leak users’ search engine queries [42]; DNS queries can also reveal the types of operating
systems [53]. Therefore, we study a new type of privacy risk introduced by DNS traces: to
which extent network users can be uniquely identified merely based on the way they issue
DNS queries? We accomplish this objective by designing behavioral fingerprints, where a
DNS-based fingerprint aims to uniquely identify its corresponding user in DNS traffic and
stay immune to the change of time.
DNS-based fingerprints, once successfully derived, have strong privacy implications.
For example, they can be used to de-anonymize the DNS traces with anonymized sources.
To be more specific, when DNS traces are shared, the source (e.g., the IP address) that
issues the DNS query is usually anonymized (e.g., by obscuring the IP address using
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hash functions). However, one can learn behavioral fingerprints from un-anonymized DNS
traces and use the acquired fingerprints to reveal the presence of specific users in (other)
anonymized traces. In addition, if one can get access to DNS traces collected from mul-
tiple access networks (e.g., through open DNS services or collecting traces from multiple
networks), he/she can track users’ locations across different networks by using behavioral
fingerprints to reveal users in DNS traces.
In this chapter, we aim at investigating the extent to which behavioral fingerprints
can be derived and measuring their accuracy on identifying the presence of correspond-
ing network users. As a means towards this end, we have proposed a set of new patterns,
which collectively form behavioral fingerprints. We also built a distributed, scalable sys-
tem, namely DNSMiner, to automatically derive DNS-based behavioral fingerprints from a
massive amount of DNS traces. Specifically, we make the following contributions.
• We have designed five new patterns including domain set, domain sequence, window-
aware domain sequence, period behavior, and hourly behavior, which collectively
form behavioral fingerprints. These patterns systematically characterize DNS behav-
iors from three aspects including the domain name, the inter-domain relationship,
and the temporal behavior. Although more patterns might be discovered to enhance
behavioral fingerprints, our proposed patterns serve as a lower bound of the capabil-
ities to use DNS behaviors to fingerprint network users.
• We have built a system, namely DNSMiner, to automatically mine behavioral finger-
prints from a massive amount of DNS traces. The design of the system leverages
the MapReduce distributed infrastructure to scale up the system performance. After
being deployed in a 15-nodes Hadoop platform, DNSMiner can process more than
467 million DNS queries using approximately 4 hours.
• We have performed extensive evaluation based on a large volume of DNS queries
collected from a large campus network across two weeks.
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The experimental results demonstrated that the behavioral fingerprints derived from
a historical DNS stream can effectively identify users in a new DNS stream. To be
more specific, 69.63% of users, who have behavioral fingerprints in the historical
DNS stream and experience persistent DNS activities in the new DNS stream, can
be identified using their behavioral fingerprints. Among these identifiable users, our
system accomplishes a high accuracy of 98.74% and a low false positive rate of
1.26%.
2.2 Related Work
Information leakage through collected network data has been recognized as a significant
privacy concern, thereby attracting a lot of research efforts. A rich body of literature [75,
47, 11, 85, 84, 89] have been proposed to infer application-level users’ activities from
(encrypted) network traffic. Chen et al. [11] have leveraged communication patterns of
HTTP connections to infer the activities taken by browser users. In [85, 84], Wright et al.
have built statistical models to reveal languages and even spoken phases from encrypted
VoIP traffic. Zhang et al. [89] designed a hierarchical classification system to identify
users’ online activities (i.e., a user’s running applications) based on network-level traffic
patterns. Sun et al. [75] also created traffic signatures to reveal webpages visited by users
in encrypted network traffic. Different from these works that focus on inferring users’
activities, our work targets at inferring users’ identities.
Pang [61] et al. generated user fingerprints based on encrypted wireless traffic pat-
terns. However, compared to deriving user fingerprints from wireless traffic, fingerprinting
users based on DNS traffic is faced with unique challenges since DNS traffic has less se-
mantics. Particularly, although encrypted, the wireless traffic can expose the set of SSIDs,
packet sizes, and MAC protocol fields used by a user. Comparatively, DNS queries only
make visible the domain name and the timestamp if the source IP is anonymized. There-
11
fore, how to design effective patterns based on semantic-limited DNS queries becomes the
key of our solution. The work closest to ours is [32], where Herrmann et al designed
a learning-based approach to attribute sessions of DNS queries to their corresponding
users. However, our work significantly differs from the method proposed in [32] from
two perspectives. First, a single feature, the visiting frequency of popular domains for
each host, was adopted in [32] to characterize users’ behaviors while we designed multi-
faceted features (i.e., total 5 features) to systematically characterize users’ behaviors from
three different perspectives. Second, the method [32] needs to separate a DNS stream
into sessions according to the timestamp of DNS queries, which implies the necessity for
fine-grained timing information for DNS queries. Despite the fact that our current im-
plementation also used timestamp for DNS queries, the first pattern (i.e., the domain set
pattern) is time-independent; the second and third patterns (i.e., the domain sequence and
window-aware domain sequence patterns) only concern the order in which DNS queries
are issued in each day. This implies that our method can be used in DNS streams with
coarse-grained timing information. In fact, the domain sequence and window-aware do-
main sequence patterns collaboratively accomplished a high detection rate of 90.72% in
our experiment. A few projects [42, 53] investigated information leakage from the same
type of network traffic used by our work - the passively collected DNS packets. However,
their objectives are different from ours. To be specific, Krishnan et al. [42] aimed at recov-
ering search engine queries by investigating correlated domain names and Matsunaka et
al. [53] intended to fingerprint operating systems rather than network users. Several meth-
ods [15, 82, 57] have been proposed to de-anonymize network data. Specifically, Coull
et al. [15] has proposed techniques to de-anonymize network flows by comparing the ob-
jects from the unanonymized and anonymized network data directly. Narayanan et al. [82]
and Wondracek et al. [57] have leveraged the topology of an unanonymized social net-
work to effectively identify users in an anonymized social network. Despite the fact that
our method leverages different data sources, we do not need auxiliary information (e.g.,
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Figure 2.1: DNSMiner architecture; Reprinted from [39]
the context of the anonymized data and additional topologies of unanonymized social net-
works). Nevertheless, DNS behavioral fingerprints extracted by our method complement
existing methods [61, 15, 82, 57].
2.3 System
The architectural overview of DNSMiner is presented in Fig. 2.1. DNSMiner takes as
input a set of DNS-query streams, which is denoted as S = {S1, S2, . . . , SN}. Each
stream (e.g., Si) contains DNS queries issued by a user (e.g., ui) over a certain time pe-
riod (e.g., several days). A stream is a series of tuples, where each tuple is denoted as
< u, domain, timestamp >. u, domain, and timestamp refer to the user identity, domain
name, and the querying time, respectively because DNS queries are in a good position for
deriving fingerprint patterns in [32] and our DNS-query streams form is suitable for reflect
the behaviors of users DNS activities. In a network where an IP address can be associated
with a user, we can use IP addresses to represent users’ identities. DNSMiner aims at gen-
erating a DNS-based behavioral fingerprint, namely Fi, for a user ui, where Fi is defined
as a finite set of patterns (i.e., Fi = {F 1i , F 2i . . . FKi }). Each pattern in the fingerprint is
named as a fingerprint pattern. Ideally, fingerprint patterns should be i) unique to their cor-
responding user (i.e., persistent to their corresponding users) and ii) immune to the change
of time.
To illustrate the detailed design of DNSMiner, we first formulate the mining process
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of fingerprints (see Section 2.3.1). Next, we will discuss specific patterns used by DNS-
Miner and the motivations behind their design (see Section 2.3.2). Finally, we briefly de-
scribe the implementation of DNSMiner that takes advantage of MapReduce [22] to achieve
high scalability (see Section 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Problem Formulation
2.3.1.1 Pattern Mining
DNSMiner aims at mining fingerprint patterns that exhibit both significant persistence and
uniqueness to a user. Towards this end, we start from defining persistence and uniqueness
of a fingerprint pattern. DNSMiner aggregates the DNS stream from a user (e.g., ui) into
a set of transactions (denoted as Ti = {T 1i , T 2i , . . . , TMi }), where each transaction T ki is a
set of tuples issued by ui within the same epoch. Since Internet activities usually exhibit
strong diurnal patterns [68], we currently use one day to represent an epoch. We denote
“T ki satisfies F ” if the pattern F is observed in T
k
i . The specific meaning of “satisfy” varies
for different patterns and we will illustrate it along with the introduction of the patterns. For
instance, if F is a set of domains, then T ki satisfies F when all domains in F are contained
in the set of domains that are extracted from all tuples in T ki . We introduce a function
mt(F, Ti) that returns all transactions in Ti that satisfy F . Specifically, mt(F, Ti) is defined
as
mt(F, Ti) = {T ki ∈ Ti | T ki satisfies F} (2.1)
We subsequently define a function supp(F, Ti) to quantify the persistence of a pattern (i.e.,
F ) across the transactions generated by a user ui. Its formal definition is presented as
supp(F, Ti) =
|mt(F, Ti)|
|Ti|
(2.2)
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The supp(F, Ti) characterizes two trends. If a pattern F is persistent to ui, supp(F, Ti)
tends to be large. In contrast, a transient pattern is inclined to yield small supp() value. We
use a pre-defined threshold, namely α, to discriminate between persistent patterns and tran-
sient ones. Specificically, F is considered to be persistent to ui if supp(F, Ti) ≥ α. We de-
note the set of persistent patterns for a user ui as P (Ti), where P (Ti) = {F |supp(F, Ti) ≥
α}.
However, the high persistence of a pattern does not guarantee its uniqueness since a
persistent pattern for ui could also be a persistent pattern for an another user. We therefore
define another metric, namely contrast confidence, to quantify uniqueness of a persistent
pattern (e.g., F ) for a user ui (i.e., how well it F can differentiate ui from other users).
conf(F, Ti) =
supp(F, Ti)∑
F∈P (Tj) supp(F, Tj)
, where F ∈ P (Ti) (2.3)
conf(F,Ti) characterizes the following trends: if a pattern is persistent to many users,
then its contrast confidence tends to be low; otherwise, its contrast confidence tends to
be high. Again, a threshold β is introduced in our current design to differentiate these
two trends. A persistent pattern F will be considered as a fingerprint pattern for ui if
conf(F,Ti) ≥ β.
2.3.1.2 Pattern Matching
Given an unknown user uu and his/her associated DNS stream, the pattern matching phase
of DNSMiner aims at identifying whether this DNS stream can be attributed to any known
user. To this end, DNSMiner will first follow the same method discussed in Section 2.3.1.1
to obtain persistent patterns for uu. Specifically, we will derive a set of DNS transac-
tions (denoted as Tu) for the unknown user uu and subsequently identify persistent patterns
P (Tu). It is worth noting that the same criteria for epoch representation (e.g., 24 hours)
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and the same value of α will be applied. Next, we will evaluate the similarity between
an unknown user uu and a known user ui, whose fingerprint is denoted as Fi. A distance
function, denoted as dist(uu, ui), is consequently defined as
dist(uu, ui) = 1−
∑
conf(F ki , Ti)∑
conf(F ji , Ti)
, (2.4)
where F ki ∈ P (Tu) ∩ Fi and F ji ∈ Fi
∑
conf(F ki , Ti) is the accumulated confidence for all patterns that belong to the in-
tersection of ui’s fingerprint patterns and uu’s persistent patterns;
∑
conf(F ji , Ti) is the
accumulated confidence for all patterns in ui’s fingerprint. If P (Tu) ∩ Fi accounts for a
large percentage of patterns in Fi, which implies that two users tend to be similar, the dis-
tance tends to be small. If multiple users who have fingerprints have non-zero distance with
uu, we assign uu to the user who has the smallest distance.
It is worth noting that a user with transient DNS behaviors may introduce a large
volume of noises when discovering persistent patterns. For example, if a user is only active
for one epoch (i.e., there is only one transaction for this user), then all of patterns for
this user would be persistent since they are active for that transaction, resulting 100% for
the supp() function. A large number of “persistent” patterns generated by transient users
may significantly affect the effectiveness for both pattern generation and matching. In the
pattern generation phase, these patterns may drastically decrease the contrast confidence
of persistent patterns for persistent IPs. In the pattern matching phase, a transient user
is likely to have a large overlap with a known user with respect to their patterns, which
implies a false positive. Therefore, in our current design, we only consider those users (or
IP addresses) that are sufficiently persistent by themselves. Specifically, if a set of users
(or IP addresses) subject to analysis have up to M transactions, our implementation only
considers those IP addresses that are active for at least M
2
transactions. For example, if a
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set of IP addresses have up to 7 transactions, we will only analyze their users that are active
for at least 4 transactions.
2.3.2 Patterns
The querying behaviors of DNS are closely related to networking activities of individual
users. For example, visiting a website or starting a network application (e.g., an instant
messenger) usually triggers the resolution of associated domain(s). The routine and per-
sonal networking activities of a user may lead to persistent DNS patterns that are unique
to him/her. Based on this intuition, we have designed five types of DNS patterns that char-
acterize a user’s DNS querying behaviors from three perspectives, including the domain
name (i.e., Pattern 1), the inter-domain relationship (i.e., Pattern 2 and 3), and temporal
behavior (Pattern 4 and 5). In this section, we will present the definitions of these patterns
and the motivation behind their design.
Pattern 1 - Domain Set: A user may have steady interest for certain websites and use
some applications routinely. These activities are likely to result in a set of domains that are
repeatedly queried by this user across multiple epochs. Since the interest and application
usage patterns are highly personal, the repeatedly queried domains may vary drastically
across different network users. We therefore introduce the domain set pattern (denoted as
Fdomain), which is simply a set of domains that meets the requirements of persistence and
uniqueness. Particularly, a transaction T satisfies the domain name pattern Fdomain if all
domains in Fdomain are observed in transaction T .
In order to identify Fdomain ideally, we can enumerate all possible domain set based on
all domains derived from each transaction of a user, where the smallest domain set contains
a single domain from this transaction and the largest domain set contains all domains in
this transaction. We can then evaluate the persistence and uniqueness of these domain sets.
Unfortunately, when the number of domains involved in a transaction is large, the sheer
volume of domain sets will become overwhelming. In order to solve this problem, we
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Table 2.1: Transactions and their associated domains for two users across 5 epochs, where
{a,b} becomes the domain set fingerprint pattern for u1; Reprinted from [39]
Transaction
Domains
Epoch
u1 u2
T1 a, b, c, d a, c 1
T2 a, b a, e 2
T3 b, a, f, k a, b, c 3
T4 e, f b, k 4
T5 c, d b 5
generate domain sets that contain up to N unique domains, where N = 2 for our current
implementation.
Table 2.1 presents an illustrative example: two users, u1 and u2, are active across
five consecutive epochs, resulting in five transactions, respectively. All domains queried
by u1 and u2 for each epoch are listed in the second and third columns in Table 2.1. If
we configure α = 3
5
, the u1 has persistent Fdomain patterns including {a}, {b} and {a,b}
since supp({a}, T1) = |mt({a},T1)||T1| =
3
5
≥ 3
5
, supp({b}, T1) = |mt({b},T1)||T1| =
3
5
≥ 3
5
, and
supp({a, b}, T1) = |mt({a,b},T1)||T1| =
3
5
≥ 3
5
. Similarly, u2 will have two persistent patterns
including {a} and {b}, where supp({a}, T2) = |mt({a},T2)||T2| =
3
5
≥ 3
5
and supp({b}, T2) =
|mt({b},T2)|
|T2| =
3
5
≥ 3
5
. Considering only these two users, it is easy to reach a conclusion that
conf({a}, T1) = 12 , conf({b}, T1) = 12 , conf({a, b}, T1) = 1, conf({a}, T2) = 12 , and
conf({b}, T2) = 12 . If we set β = 60%, {a,b} becomes the fingerprint pattern for u1.
Pattern 2 - Domain Sequence: A network user’s routine networking activities could
involve his/her individualized preferences and the order in which network activities are
carried might be able to reflect such preferences. We consequently define a domain se-
quence pattern denoted as Fseq, where Fseq is a finite sequence of domains. Given two
domains in Fseq (i.e., di ∈ Fseq and dj ∈ Fseq), di  dj means that di is issued before dj .
Similar to the domain set pattern, the ideal implementation to derive domain sequence
patterns should consider domain sequences with all possible lengths derived from a trans-
action. Unfortunately, the ideal solution could result in a prohibitively huge volume of
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domain sequence patterns when the number of domains contained in a transaction becomes
large. Therefore, we only generate domain sequence patterns composed of two domains.
To be more specific, Fseq = (di, dj) where di  dj in the transaction.
Compared to domain set patterns, domain sequence patterns offer an additional dimen-
sion to differentiate two users. For example, if two users visit facebook and twitter
routinely, they will have two identical Fdomain patterns (i.e., “www.facebook.com” and
“www.twitter.com”). However, if the first user always visits facebook before twitter
while the second user follows the reverse order, DNSMiner will generate two disparate
persistent domain sequence patterns (i.e., (www.facebook.com,www.twitter.com) and
(www.twitter.com,www.facebook.com)) for these two users, respectively.
Pattern 3 - Window-Aware Domain Sequence: DNSMiner further expands the domain
sequence patterns by incorporating the first and last time when a domain is visited. Specifi-
cally, rather than considering every possible pairwise sequence for di and dj from all tuples
within a transaction, DNSMiner considers the tuples in which di and dj are first and last
observed. To this end, we extract a 3-tuple for each domain (e.g., di) in a transaction de-
noted as < di, si, ei >, where si and ei refer to the first and last time di is observed in
the transaction, respectively. In order to illustrate the design of this pattern, we consider
two domains, di and dj , whose 3-tuples are < di, si, ei > and < dj, sj, ej >, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that di alphabetically precedes dj . The compari-
son of both starting and ending times of these two domains will result in four 4-tuples
as illustrated in Table 2.2. The third element in a 4-tuple indicates how two domains are
compared. For example, “ss” indicates that di’s starting time is compared to dj’s starting
time and “se” indicates the comparison between di’s starting time and dj’s ending time.
The second column in Table 2.2 shows rules we have used to assign values for the fourth
variable. It is worth noting that these four window-aware sequence patterns might not be
independent. For example, if p3 in< di, dj, es, p3 > is 0, which means that the last time we
observe di precedes the first time we observe dj , then all p∗ variables in other 4-tuples for
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Table 2.2: Window-Aware Patterns; Reprinted from [39]
Window-Aware Patterns p∗’s Value
< di, dj , ss, p1 > if(si < sj) p1 = 0; else p1 = 1;
< di, dj , se, p2 > if(si < ej) p2 = 0; else p2 = 1;
< di, dj , es, p3 > if(ei < sj) p3 = 0; else p3 = 1;
< di, dj , ee, p4 > if(ei < ej) p4 = 0; else p4 = 1;
Table 2.3: A sequence of DNS queries; Reprinted from [39]
Timestamp t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
Domain a b a b b a
di and dj will always be 0. We exploit such dependency in our implementation to reduce
the number of patterns yielded for each pair of domains.
Table 2.3 illustrates a series of domains queried by a user together with their times-
tamps, where all these domains belong to one transaction and t0 < t1 . . . t4 < t5. For this
user, two 3-tuples in the form of < di, si, ei > will be derived, including < a, t0, t5 > and
< b, t1, t4 >. For example, < a, t0, t5 > indicates that the domain a is first and last queried
in this transaction at t0 and t5, respectively. We follow the definition of window-aware
patterns as indicated in Table 2.2 to derive four window-aware patterns for this example,
which includes < a, b, ss, 0 >, < a, b, se, 0 >, < a, b, es, 1 >, and < a, b, ee, 1 >. As
indicated in this example, some patterns may imply others, making it possible to simplify
the generation of window-aware patterns. For example, if we know < a, b, ss, 0 >, we can
directly conclude that < a, b, se, 0 > without generating it from data.
Pattern 4 - Period Behavior: Network users’ networking activities often exhibit strong
temporal patterns. For example, a user could visit a news website every morning while
another user surfs it over every afternoon. Consequently, each domain together with its
temporal information may well represent a user. We therefore introduce the Period Be-
havior pattern (denoted as Fperiod), which is defined as a domain-period combination. The
“period” refers to a tag indicating “morning”, “afternoon”, and “evening”. In order to de-
rive such pattern, we first map the timestamp of each tuple into one of three period tags,
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Figure 2.2: DNSMiner implementation of identifying persistent patterns; Reprinted from
[39]
where “morning”, “afternoon”, and “evening” stand for [5:00AM, 11:00AM), [11:00AM,
5:00PM), and [5:00PM, 5:00AM), respectively. Next, for each tuple, we integrate its
domain and its corresponding period tag into a domain-period combination. For exam-
ple, (www.facebook.com, 2013-09-17 08:30:23), a tuple in a DNS stream, will generate
(www.facebook.com, morning) as its Period Behavior pattern.
Pattern 5 - Hourly Behavior: We further introduce the Hourly Behavior pattern to
characterize a user’s networking activities at a finer granularity. Rather than mapping
a timestamp into a period tag, DNSMiner maps a timestamp to its corresponding hour,
thereby leading to a domain-hour combination denoted as Fhourly. For instance, the tuple
(www.facebook.com, 2013-09-17 08:30:23) will be mapped into (www.facebook.com, 08).
2.3.3 System Implementation
A network user may generate a large number of DNS queries. As the number of network
users increases, the scalability of DNSMiner becomes a concern. To address the challenge,
we have implemented DNSMiner using the Hadoop MapReduce platform. The two phases
of Map and Reduce workflows in the implementation are presented in Fig. 2.2. DNS-
Miner first identifies persistent patterns for each user. Since the identification of persistent
patterns for each user is independent to that for other users, we can easily parallelize the
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computation by partitioning/mapping tuples (i.e., < uid, domain, timestamp >) into re-
ducers based on their uids (i.e., the step 1© in Fig. 2.2). Each reducer will then enumerate
all patterns for each transaction of ui; for each derived pattern F
j
i , its supp() value in the
context of ui will be subsequently calculated; we consequently apply the predefined thresh-
old α and preserve all persistent patterns (i.e., patterns whose supp() values are greater than
α). These three actions together are performed in reducers for the step 2© in Fig. 2.2. Next,
we partition patterns together with their associated uids and supp() values into reducers,
where the pattern serves as the key (the step 3© in Fig. 2.2). Finally, each reducer will
calculate the contrast confidence for each pattern with respect to each user and yield those
unique ones in the step 4© (e.g., conf(F, T ) ≥ β).
2.4 Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype system named DNSMiner, and evaluated it using DNS
queries collected from a large campus network. Our evaluation aims at answering three
questions: “Can DNS-based fingerprints effectively identify their corresponding network
users?”, “How do parameter values impact DNSMiner’s effectiveness?”, and “How effec-
tive is each category of patterns?”. The following sections describe the experimental setup
and evaluation results.
2.4.1 Experimental Setup
We obtained DNS queries collected from a large campus network of Xi’an Jiaotong Uni-
versity, China, where the DNS queries are collected below the major recursive DNS servers
used by the campus network. Aiming at facilitating the network management, the campus
network assigns static IP addresses to the vast majority of its users after they register at the
network management center (i.e., DHCP is not supported for the network users). Only a
few buildings use dynamic IP addresses and we have excluded DNS queries issued from
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Table 2.4: The # of IPs in D1 and D2, # of persistent IPs (|P1| and |P2|), # of IPs with
persistent patterns in P1 and P2, and # of IPs with fingerprint patterns in D1 (i.e., |FP1|);
Reprinted from [39]
Week # of IPs # of # of IPs with # of IPs with
Persistent IPs Persistent Patterns Fingerprint Patterns
Week 1 (D1) 55,459 16,003 12,900 11,921
Week 2 (D2) 54,751 9,120 7,119 -
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Figure 2.3: The CDF distribution of the maximum supp() for all persistent IP addresses in
D1 (i.e., all IPs in P1). A significant percentage (64.18%) of IPs in P1 have patterns that
are persistent across 7 epochs; Reprinted from [39]
their corresponding subnets. Sensors were deployed to collect DNS queries that are issued
by all hosts in campus network. For each DNS query, three pieces of information were
extracted, including the domain name, the timestamp, and the IP address that issues this
query. We collected two sets of DNS queries from two consecutive weeks at September
2013, which are denoted as D1 and D2, respectively. As illustrated in the second column
of Table 2.4, D1 and D2 contain 55,459 and 54,751 unique IP addresses, respectively. Both
D1 and D2 contain a large number of DNS queries (i.e., 467,388,490 queries in D1 and
238,993,575 in D2).
As Internet activities typically show diurnal patterns [68, 21], we considers one day
as one epoch. Specifically, an epoch starts from 5:00AM and lasts for 24 hours. Both
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transaction-sets for fingerprint extraction and matching contain 7 epochs (i.e., for 7 con-
secutive days). We configure α = 5
7
, which means that a fingerprint pattern has to be
persistent for at least 5
7
out of the active days for its corresponding IP address. We also set
β = 60%.
We use the queries of the first 7 days (i.e., D1) to derive DNS fingerprints and those
of the remaining week (i.e., D2) to evaluate the extent to which the fingerprints can effec-
tively de-anonymize users in a new DNS stream. As we have discussed in Section 2.3, IP
addresses with transient DNS behaviors are likely to introduce noises. Therefore, we only
consider those IP addresses that experience sufficient persistence by themselves. Specifi-
cally, since D1 and D2 contain up to 7 transactions, we preserve those IP addresses that are
active for at least half of the 7 transactions (i.e., for at least 4 transactions). We use P1 to
represent a set of persistent IPs in D1 and P2 in D2. As illustrated in Table 2.4, P1 and P2
contain 16, 003 and 9, 120 IP addresses, respectively.
2.4.2 Experimental Results
2.4.2.1 Fingerprint Extraction
The first step of DNSMiner is to assess the persistence of patterns for each IP address in
P1. Specifically, for each IP address in P1, we extract all of its patterns, investigate their
supp() values, and preserve those whose supp() values are greater than the predefined
threshold α. We identify the maximum supp() value for each IP address and plot the
distribution of maximum supp() value for all IPs in P1 in Fig. 2.3. As illustrated in the
distribution, a significantly large percentage of persistent IPs (i.e., IPs in P1) indeed have
persistent patterns. Particularly, 64.18% of IPs in P1 have the maximum supp() value of 1,
indicating that each of these IPs has repeatedly shown at least one pattern across entire 7
epochs. In addition, a large percentage of 80.60% of IPs in P1 have at least one persistent
pattern whose supp() value is greater than α = 5
7
. This results in 12,900 IPs with persistent
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patterns in P1, which account for totally 313,248,287 persistent patterns.
The second step of DNSMiner is to investigate the uniqueness of persistent patterns
based on their contrast confidence (i.e., conf(F ji , Ti)). Again, conf(F ji , Ti) quantifies the
uniqueness of a pattern F ji to its corresponding user ui. In order to visualize the experi-
ment results, for each IP with persistent patterns, we derive the highest contrast confidence
for all its persistent patterns; we then present the distribution of the highest contrast con-
fidence values for these IPs in Fig. 2.4. As illustrated in Fig. 2.4, about 70% percentage
of IPs with persistent patterns have patterns whose contrast confidence is 1, which indi-
cates that these patterns are unique for their corresponding users. In DNSMiner, we use
the predefined threshold β = 60% to further identify those persistent that also experience
significant uniqueness (i.e., fingerprint patterns). Totally, DNSMiner has identified 11,921
IP addresses that have fingerprint patterns, where these IP addresses form a set namely
FP1 and FP1 ⊆ P1. DNSMiner totally generated 222,508,026 fingerprint patterns, among
which the domain set pattern, the domain sequence pattern, the window-aware domain se-
quence pattern, the period pattern, and hourly behavior pattern account for 16.43%, 11%,
72.51%, 0.02%, and 0.04%, respectively. We count the total number of fingerprint patterns
for each IP address and plot their distribution in Fig. 2.5. The distribution indicates that
these IPs tend to have a large number of DNS fingerprint patterns, implying strongly dis-
criminative DNS behaviors. Particularly, more than 78% of IP addresses in FP1 have at
least 100 fingerprint patterns.
2.4.2.2 Fingerprint Matching
As introduced in Section 2.4.2.1, FP1 represents a set of IPs in D1 whose DNS behavioral
fingerprints have been derived by DNSMiner. We also use P1 and P2 to represent sets of
persistent IPs for D1 and D2, respectively. For fingerprint matching, our objective is to
use fingerprint patterns for IPs in FP1 to reveal their presence in P2. Specifically, we
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Figure 2.4: The CDF distribution of the highest contrast confidence for each IP address
that has at least one persistent pattern. Approximately 70% have unique persistent patterns
(i.e., with contrast confidence of 1); Reprinted from [39]
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Figure 2.5: The CDF distribution of the number of fingerprint patterns for each IP address.
IP addresses with fingerprint patterns tend to have a large number of fingerprint patterns;
Reprinted from [39]
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perform the pattern matching as discussed in Section 2.3 to identify all IPs in P2 whose
distance (i.e., dist(uu, ui)) is smaller than 1 compared to any IP in FP1, where these IPs
together form a set named as K. K can be further divided into two sets, namely KC and
KI , which represent the IPs that are correctly and incorrectly identified, respectively (i.e.,
K = KC ∪ KI). Subsequently, we define the following three metrics to quantify the
effectiveness of fingerprint patterns.
• The percentage of identified IP addresses (II): |K||FP1∩P2| . We expect DNSMiner to
identify all IPs in FP1 ∩P2 since IPs in FP1 ∩P2 indeed have fingerprint patterns in
the first week and are persistent in the second week. |K||FP1∩P2| represents the overall
effectiveness on identifying IPs in a new DNS stream.
• The detection rate: |KC||K| (DR). This ration shows the ratio of the number of correctly
identified IPs over the number of all identified IPs.
• The false positive rate: |KI||K| (FP). This ration shows the ratio of the number of incor-
rectly identified IPs over the number of all identified IPs.
We have performed the evaluation of fingerprint matching using the DNS stream of
D2, where the evaluation results are presented in Table 2.5. Specifically, 4,894 IPs in P2
(i.e., persistent IPs in the second week) have fingerprint patterns in the first week (i.e.,
|FP1 ∩ P2| = 4,894). In other words, the ideal objective is to identify all these 4,894 IPs
in the DNS stream of the second week (i.e., D2) using their fingerprint patterns extracted
from the first week (i.e., D1). The matching results show that totally 3,408 IPs have been
identified, resulting in the percentage of identified IPs of 69.63%. Among these 3,408 IP
addresses, 3,365 IPs are correctly attributed to those IPs in FP1, resulting a high detection
rate of 98.74% and a low false positive rate of 1.26%.
We have deployed DNSMiner on a Hadoop platform with 15 nodes. The entire process
for both extracting and matching fingerprint patterns consumes approximately 4 hours.
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Table 2.5: The accuracy of identifying users in a new DNS stream D2 using fingerprint
patterns extracted from a historical DNS stream D1. Among 69.63% IPs that are identified
by fingerprint patterns, 98.74% are correctly revealed; Reprinted from [39]
Week |P2| |FP1 ∩ P2| |K| |KC| |KI| II(%) DR(%) FP(%)
Week 2 (D2) 9,120 4,894 3,408 3,365 43 69.63 98.74 1.26
Table 2.6: The detection performance under different α and β values. “PI” indicates the
percentage of IPs in P1 that have fingerprint patterns; “II” is denoted as the percentage
of IPs in FP1 ∩ P2 that are detected by fingerprint patterns; “DR” and “FP” refer to the
detection rate and false positive rate, respectively; Reprinted from [39]
Parameter
α = 4/7 α = 5/7
PI(%) II(%) DR(%) FP(%) PI(%) II(%) DR(%) FP(%)
β = 30% 74.04 68.91 92.42 7.58 72.48 68.16 94.17 5.83
40% 73.28 69.45 93.33 6.67 71.29 68.70 95.81 4.19
50% 72.66 70.02 96.09 3.91 70.95 69.26 98.56 1.44
60% 72.35 70.39 96.25 3.75 70.82 69.63 98.74 1.26
70% 71.98 70.43 95.79 4.21 70.65 69.69 97.45 2.55
80% 71.86 70.49 94.78 5.22 70.36 69.77 96.16 3.84
α = 6/7 α = 7/7
PI(%) II(%) DR(%) FP(%) PI(%) II(%) DR(%) FP(%)
β = 30% 68.98 62.00 90.19 9.81 48.02 43.80 87.80 12.20
40% 67.66 62.50 91.74 8.26 47.53 44.15 88.85 11.15
50% 66.56 63.01 93.93 6.07 47.46 44.51 90.74 9.26
60% 66.29 63.34 94.04 5.96 47.34 44.74 90.82 9.18
70% 65.80 63.42 93.83 6.17 47.27 44.83 89.37 10.63
80% 65.01 63.68 93.07 6.93 47.15 44.99 89.14 10.86
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Figure 2.6: The trend of detection rates when α increases given a fixed value for β, where
DNSMiner achieves the best accuracy of 98.74% when α = 5/7 and β = 60%); Reprinted
from [39]
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2.4.2.3 Evaluating The Impact of Parameter Values
DNSMiner needs two parameters including α and β to be configured. While the eval-
uation result based on the current configuration (α = 5
7
and β = 60%) yields a high
detection rate, we further investigate how parameter values affect the system effective-
ness. Specifically, we assign a wide range of values to α (i.e., α = 4
7
, 5
7
, 6
7
, 7
7
) and β
(i.e., β = 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%) and then perform the fingerprint extraction and
matching for each combination of α’ and β’ values. The experimental results are summa-
rized in Table 2.6, where each cell in the table contains i) the percentage of IPs in P1 that
have fingerprint patterns (i.e., |FP1||P1| ), ii) the percentage of identified IPs (i.e.,
|K|
|FP1∩P2| ), iii)
the detection rate (i.e., |KC||K| ), and iv) the false positive rate (i.e.,
|KI|
|K| ). Fig. 2.6 visualizes
the trend of detection rates when α increases from 4
7
to 7
7
for a fixed value of β.
As indicated by the experimental results, when both α and β increase, the percentage
of IPs in P1 that have fingerprint patterns drops. For example, 74.04% of IPs in P1 have
fingerprint patterns given α = 4
7
and β = 30% while the percentage is 47.15% given α = 7
7
and β = 80%. The changes of α and β affectK and FP1 simultaneously, thereby impacting
the percentage of identified IP addresses (i.e., |K||FP1∩P2| ). This measure stays very stable
(i.e., close to 70%) when α = 4
7
, 5
7
and all β values under investigation. When α ≥ 6
7
, this
measure drops significantly (i.e., around 63% for α = 6
7
and 44% for α = 7
7
). Despite the
fluctuation of the percentage of persistent IPs with fingerprint patterns and the percentage
of identified IP addresses along with the changes of α and β, DNSMiner accomplishes
high detection performance. Specifically, for all combinations of α and β values in our
experiments, the detection rates are above 87.80%. Particularly, when we configure 4
7
≤
α ≤ 6
7
, all β values lead to detection rates higher than 90%. Such experiment results imply
that our method accomplishes the high detection accuracy over a wide range of parameter
values. Nevertheless, considering the percentage of users with fingerprint patterns (i.e.,
“PI”) and the percentage of identified IPs (i.e., “II”), α ∈ [4
7
, 5
7
] and β ∈ [40%, 70%] yield
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Table 2.7: The detection performance of DNSMiner for each category of patterns: “Domain
name” refers to the domain set pattern; “Inter-domain relationship” includes the domain se-
quence pattern and window-aware domain sequence pattern; “Temporal behavior” contains
period and hourly behavior pattern; Reprinted from [39]
Pattern Category II(%) DR(%) FP(%)
Domain name 29.65 85.83 14.17
Inter-domain relationship 43.21 90.72 9.28
Temporal behavior 32.50 87.90 12.10
the best detection performance with approximately (i.e., approximately 70% for both “PI”
and “II”, and detection rates higher than 95%).
We have also investigated the detection performance of DNSMiner when only a cate-
gory of patterns are used and the experiment results are presented in Table 2.7, where α = 5
7
and β = 60%. As indicated in Table 2.7, patterns belonging to the category of the inter-
domain relationship resulted in the best detection rates (i.e., a detection rate of 90.72% and
a false positive rate of 9.28%) compared to patterns in the other two categories. Neverthe-
less, all these patterns collectively accomplish the best detection performance as indicated
in Table 2.6, indicating that all patterns complement each other in DNSMiner.
2.5 Discussion
DNSMiner currently concentrates on network users whose DNS activities are persistent.
For example, network users who were active for at least 4 days out of 7 days were con-
sidered in our experiments. Despite the fact that such design mitigates the noises caused
by network users with transit DNS activities, it may actually result in limitations for the
practical usage of DNSMiner. First, DNSMiner by design cannot generate fingerprint pat-
terns for those network users with transit DNS activities. Second, DNSMiner requires that
DNS queries can be attributed to their corresponding users over a relative long period (e.g.,
across the epochs for fingerprint generation). Specifically, when we use an IP address to
represent a user, the IP address should not change across the epochs for pattern genera-
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tion and matching. For networks using static IP addresses, this limitation can be easily
overcome, which is actually the case for our evaluation. However, when the IP address as-
sociated with a user changes frequently (e.g., in networks that use dynamic IPs with small
lease time), it becomes a challenging problem to directly attribute IP addresses to their
corresponding users across a series of epochs.
We acknowledge such limitations in the current design and our future work will focus
on systematically addressing them. Specifically, a few potential improvements can be ex-
plored. First, we plan to design an algorithm that can adaptively define epochs for each IP
address and aggregate them into transaction set according to the DNS activities of this IP
address. Particularly, the transaction set will be discovered in a way that it is very unlikely
for the host to change its IP address across the epochs belonging to this transaction set.
Second, rather than manually defining fingerprint patterns, we intend to propose methods
that can automatically generate patterns and perform pattern selection. Particularly, we ex-
pect that the patterns will give more weight on characterizing the short-term DNS activities
of a user. Lastly, our proposed methods and features are possibly adopted to identify the
users on mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) for future work.
2.6 Summary
We present a novel system, DNSMiner, to automatically derive behavioral fingerprints from
DNS queries, where behavioral fingerprints are expected to reveal the presence of their cor-
responding users in new DNS streams whose identities are unknown (e.g., anonymized).
A behavioral fingerprint is composed of a collection of patterns that systematically char-
acterize each user’s DNS activities from three different perspectives including the domain
name, the inter-domain relationship, and the temporal behavior. The extensive evaluation
based on DNS queries collected from a large campus network has demonstrated that these
patterns can accomplish a high detection accuracy of 98.74% and a low false positive rate
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of 1.26%. Despite its high detection accuracy, more patterns could be discovered and in-
corporated into DNSMiner. Nevertheless, DNSMiner demonstrates the lower bound of the
effectiveness of using DNS-based patterns to reveal users’ presence in network traffic.
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Chapter 3: Detecting Fake Anti-Virus
Webpages
3.1 Motivation
Tremendous cyber-security concerns have led to computer systems with enhanced security
features. As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult for attackers to directly compro-
mise end users’ systems by exploiting software vulnerabilities. As an alternative strategy,
social engineering attacks, which take advantage of humans’ psychological vulnerabilities,
rapidly gain their popularity. Among various types of social engineering attacks such spam-
ming and phishing, fake Anti-Virus (AV) attacks have become one of the most significant
threats.
A fake AV attack is to disguise malware as anti-virus software and lure end users into
installing it. As web browsers become the dominating network applications, webpages have
become a major way for attackers to launch fake AV attacks [27]. Specifically, upon being
visited by a user, a fake AV webpage usually claims that it offers a customized anti-virus
product and encourages the user to install it, where the offered anti-virus product is actually
a malicious executable. In order to stimulate users’ action, a fake AV webpage could claim
that it has identified (new) infections on end users’ systems after a thorough scanning. Both
the appearance of the anti-virus product and scanning process impersonate those of popular
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Figure 3.1: An example screenshot of a fake AV webpage; Reprinted from [38]
security vendors such as Microsoft Security Essentials and Symantec Norton. Fig. 3.1
presents an example of a typical fake AV webpage, which impersonates a safe webpage to
download a free Symantec Norton Antivirus 2014. A user who approves the installation of
the fake anti-virus software will immediately render his/her system infected. Specifically, a
typical fake AV webpage asks users to follow four steps to launch a malicious attack [79].
First, a user visits a fake AV webpage using information (e.g., news, images) from search
engine and downloads a fake AV file. Next, the fake AV software shows false alarms that
warn a user of the danger of infected files, and subsequently request him to purchase a
rogue AV software as a solution for stealing his/her sensitive information (see Fig. 3.2).
As a result of users’ increasing awareness of malware threats and growing familiarity of
anti-virus software, fake AV attacks are surprisingly successful. In fact, a recent study from
Google has indicated that fake AV attacks are responsible for 50% of all malware delivered
via Internet advertising and their prevalence keeps growing [65].
Detecting fake AV webpages is therefore of great importance. However, it is a chal-
lenging task due to several typical characteristics for fake AV webpages. First, fake AV
webpages require users’ interaction to install malware and hence do not require any mali-
cious contents to perform automatic exploitation without users’ consent (e.g., shellcode).
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Figure 3.2: Example of Fake AV Webpage Attack [79]
In addition, a fake AV webpage does not need to impersonate a whole authentic anti-virus
webpage. Instead, it often uses a few representative elements from the impersonated web-
page, such as the names and icons of anti-virus products, while the remaining webpage
components could exhibit arbitrary semantics. Finally, in order to trick users into believ-
ing that the masqueraded products offer up-to-date solutions to emerging threats, attackers
may frequently update the information for both products and threats (e.g., the product ver-
sions and threat names). These characteristics easily distinguish fake AV attacks from other
prevalent web-based attacks such as drive-by downloads and phishing, and consequently
impede the direct application of the detection methods for these attacks to detect fake AV
attacks. For example, drive-by download detection methods that require the observation
of webpage content for exploitation [16], [19] or automatic binary downloading [49] will
fail to detect fake AV webpages due to the absence of malicious content for exploitation.
Phishing-webpage detection methods that rely on the similarity between a potential mali-
cious webpage and its impersonated authentic webpage [66] can be easily circumvented.
In this chapter, in order to effectively detect fake-AV detection and overcome the
aforementioned challenges, we propose a novel system, namely DART. DART employs
a collection of features to profile a webpage and further discriminate between fake AV
webpages and benign webpages by integrating these features using a statistical classifier.
These features aim to characterize a webpage by answering three questions that are critical
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for the success of a fake AV webpage. First, how does a fake AV webpage increase the
opportunity to be visited by an end user? What tricks does it use to convince an end user
to install the executable? Where is a fake webpage actually located? Specifically, DART
automatically extracts features that profile search engine optimization techniques used by
fake AV webpages, various identities to impersonate authentic security webpages, and the
network infrastructures. Since malware threats are constantly evolving, identities related
to authentic anti-virus software, such as names of the product and malware, may actively
change. In order to solve this challenge, DART can automatically discover diverse and
trendy security keywords by performing semantic analysis based on messages from popu-
lar social networks such as Twitter. We have performed extensive evaluation based on data
collected from the real-world network. Our experimental results have demonstrated that
DART can achieve a high detection rate (90.4%) with a very low false positive rate (0.2%).
3.2 Related Work
Extensive measurement efforts [65], [74] have been invested to study the severity of fake
AV attacks and gained in-depth understanding of their infrastructures and operations. For
example, Rajab et al. [65] performed large-scale study based on malicious webpages col-
lected by Google and concluded that fake AV accounted for 15% of all malware detected
on the web. Stone-Gross et al. [74] managed to acquire back-end servers for several fake
AV campaigns and revealed sophisticated techniques adopted by attackers to accomplish
robustness and agility of their networking infrastructures.
A few methods [23], [67], which target at detecting fake AV attacks, have been pro-
posed. Dietrich et al. [23] designed a method to detect fake AV attacks by dynamically
analyzing suspicious binaries. Specifically, binaries are executed and their user interfaces
will be collected. The method will aggregate binaries with similar user interfaces into clus-
ters. If several binary instances in a cluster are known to be a fake AV, their maliciousness
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can be propagated to other binaries in the same cluster. Seifert et al. [67] proposed a method
to detect fake AV webpages, which focuses on detecting webpages that show an animation
of an anti-virus scan. This method first extracts a collection of features from the snapshot
of a webpage, which aim at characterizing visual elements related to anti-virus scanning.
It further employs a statistical classifier to discriminate between fake AV webpages and le-
gitimate ones based on the derived features. These methods have demonstrated promising
detection performance. However, they suffer from several limitations, which may impede
their practical deployment and effectiveness. Specifically, the first method [23] mandates
the execution of a binary, making it extremely challenging to deploy it in end users’ hosts.
In addition, the execution of binaries implies considerable computation resources (e.g.,
mounting and cleaning virtual images), thereby significantly limiting its efficiency. The
second method [67] relies on the observation that fake AV webpages are likely to use the
animation of an anti-virus scan to “scare” end users. Unfortunately, this observation is not
always true. In fact, a fake AV webpage can simply display a text description to lure end
users into installing the binary. Consequently, the second method is prone to generating
false negatives.
Our method differs from existing detection approaches in the following aspects. First,
the system [23] detects a fake AV webpage by performing the dynamic behavior of the
binary associated with the fake AV webpage. This implies the detection engine needs a
controlled environment (e.g., a well-managed virtual machine) to perform detection. The
cost to maintain (e.g., clean and restart the image) is very high. In contrast to [23], our
method leverages webpage information, rather than dynamic behavior of a binary, to detect
fake AV webpages, thereby becoming more efficient compared to [23]. The system [67]
mainly leverages the visual appearance (the scanning animation to be more specific) of a
fake AV webpage for detection. In addition to the potential high overhead implied by image
analysis, a fake AV webpage does not necessarily need to adopt scanning animation and
therefore may evade the detection of the system [67]. Comparatively, DART uses multi-
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Figure 3.3: System Architecture of DART; Reprinted from [38]
dimensional features rather than exclusively relying on the visual appearance. In fact, in our
evaluation of lightweight features, DART can still achieve high detection accuracy without
image-based features. This implies a higher level of robustness of DART compared to the
system [67].
3.3 System
DART involves two phases, namely training phase and detection phase. In the training
phase, a statistical classifier is built based on a set of pre-labelled fake AV webpages and
benign webpages. Specifically, given the URL of a landing page, DART instructs our
browser to load this webpage and then extract a number of features. In other words, we
use a feature vector to represent a landing page and the webpages that are subsequently
loaded when the browser renders it. In the detection phase, an unknown landing page will
be converted to a feature vector and then analyzed by the statistical classifier to assess its
maliciousness. The Fig. 3.3 presents the architectural overview of DART. Considering the
fact that various well-known statistical classifiers have been widely used, how to design
features capable of distinguishing between fake AV webpages and benign webpages be-
comes of central importance. To illustrate the detailed design of DART, we first describe
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how we collect fake AV webpages on the web (see Section 3.3.1). Next, Section 3.3.2
details a method of discovery trendy and diverse security keywords and provides such real-
world keyword examples from our study data. Finally, we discuss specific patterns used by
DART and the motivations behind their design (see Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Collecting & Labeling Data
We have collected fake AV webpages to motivate our design and evaluate its performance.
To this end, we have built an instrumented browser based on csexwb2 [18], which is capa-
ble of executing dynamic content embedded in each webpage. Our instrumented browser
records detailed information for a landing page and all webpages that are subsequently
loaded by visiting the landing page, where the landing page [90], which is also known
as the root page in other literature [50], is referred to as the first webpage rendered by a
browser. To be more specific, in addition to taking a snapshot of the landing page after it
is fully loaded, the instrumented browser will keep the URL and the source code (or the
image content) of each webpage.
In order to get the ground-truth fake AV webpages, we instruct our browser to col-
lect fake AV webpages based on search engine results. We first obtain a set of security-
related keywords from a keyword research tool by WordStream [83], which provides over
a trillion keywords in their database for Search Engine Optimization (SEO). We then select
keywords relevant to virus or anti-virus, and enter a keyword together with a randomly gen-
erated word into mainstream search engines such as Google. Upon receiving search results,
our browser will visit the top 200 search results (i.e., the landing page URLs) and record
their information, yielding a set of webpages denoted as Sgoogle. Sgoogle totally contains
18,970 unique landing pages. Aiming at labelling fake AV webpages, we manually inves-
tigate the snapshot of each landing page and preserve those that encourage users to install
anti-virus software. Among them, we follow two steps to identify fake AV webpages. First,
by consulting public domain reputation services such as Malware Domain List [51]
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and SURBL Lists [76], if the domain name of a landing page has been detected as sus-
picious, we will label this landing page as a fake AV webpage. For remaining webpages,
we manually download the executable(s) from each landing page (if applicable) and lever-
age a collection of malware detection engines such as VirusTotal [78] and ClamAV [40] to
detect malicious binaries. A landing page will be labeled as a fake AV webpage if any of
its associated executable(s) is classified as malware. Such practice has resulted in a set of
total 1,230 fake AV landing pages, which is denoted as Sfake (Sfake ⊂ Sgoogle).
Next, we prepare the benign dataset. Our benign dataset is composed of three types
of webpages. First, the benign dataset contains those popular security-related webpages
from our search engine queries. These webpages are likely to be returned to users through
various search engines given their high popularity. To derive this part, we reuse the Sgoogle
dataset. Specifically, if the domain of a webpage in Sgoogle − Sfake appears in Alexa [3]
top 100,000 most popular sites, this webpage will be considered as a popular benign web-
page and then aggregated into Ssecurity−popular. Through this approach, we have identi-
fied 210 popular webpages (i.e., |Ssecurity−popular| = 210). Webpages in Ssecurity−popular
are mainly composed of popular authentic anti-virus webpages and security-related ar-
ticles (e.g., blogs). Second, the remaining webpages in Sgoogle will be aggregated into
Ssecurity−unpopular (i.e., Ssecurity−unpopular = Sgoogle − Ssecurity−popular − Sfake), where
|Ssecurity−unpopular| = 17530. These webpages represent those security-related webpages
whose popularity is relatively low. For example, many of webpages in Ssecurity−unpopular
are unpopular digital forums in which security topics are discussed. Third, our benign
dataset needs to contain those webpages that are irrelevant to security. To this end, we
again resort to Alex [3] list to visit 538 pages that are randomly selected from top 10,000
most popular webpages that are irrelevant to security, where these webpages are aggregated
into Ssecurity−irrelevant (i.e., |Ssecurity−irrelevant| = 538).
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Seed Security Keywords Expanded by DISCO Expanded by LSA
Firewall Cybercrook
Encryption Typosquatting
Security Anti-spyware RogueAntivirus
Antivirus Anti-spam Zombiecomputer
...... Rootkits Maladvertising
Backdoor Snoopware
Privacy Ransomware
...... KeyBoy
......
Table 3.1: Examples of security keywords discovered in each step; Reprinted from [38]
3.3.2 Discovering Trendy and Diverse Security Keywords
DART follows three steps to identify security keywords. It starts with a set of “seed”
security keywords from public encyclopedia repositories, which maintain a category of in-
formation related to popular security vendors and their products. The repository leveraged
by DART is Open Directory Project [60], one of the most popular public encyclopedia
repositories, where DART enumerates all words belonging to the directory of “Malicious
Software:*:Detection and Removal Tool”. Then we manually eliminate over-generic words
(e.g., “application”) as well as stopping words (e.g., “and” and “of”) and aggregate the re-
maining ones to a set denoted as Wseed. As these repositories are well maintained, words
in Wseed are likely to imply core and stable concepts in the context of anti-virus products
and security. Unfortunately, Wseed might be insufficient due to two facts. First, the public
encyclopedia repositories may lack comprehensiveness, thereby missing certain important
keywords. Second, the repositories might be updated infrequently, and hence words in
Wseed could fail to capture trendy security keywords promptly.
Next, DART leverages DISCO [41], a public API capable of retrieving the semantic
similarity between arbitrary words, to discover more diverse security keywords by expand-
ing Wseed. DISCO takes advantage of English Wikipedia to explore the semantic similarity
between two words. Specifically, given each security keyword w in Wseed, we use DISCO
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API to derive top 10 words that are most similar to w, and then aggregate them together
with w into Wdisco.
Third, since social networks have become a dominating way for information dissem-
ination, DART uses Twitter to mine trendy and more diverse security keywords by per-
forming Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) [24]. The LSA method measures the semantic
similarity by applying singular value decomposition (SVD) [52] on a term-document ma-
trix. DART collected a set of 10.9 million tweets using the public streaming API offered
by Twitter. It filtered out stopwords in each tweet. It then constructed a term-document
matrix for Latent Semantic Analysis, where the “term” and “document” are corresponding
to “word” and “tweet”, respectively. The high co-occurrence of two words in the matrix in-
dicates that they are likely to share similar semantic meaning. DART enumerates all words
that exhibit high semantic similarity to words belonging to Wdisco. Specifically, we calcu-
lated semantic similarity between any two words using cosine similarity and set a threshold
θ value to 0.75. We obtained this threshold by performed empirical evaluation: we tested
thresholds between 0.5 and 0.95 with a 0.05 increment and found that most of the security-
related words in a corpus of sampled tweets were successfully retrieved at the threshold of
0.75.
3.3.3 Designing Detection Features
In this section, we explore various features and demonstrate their effectiveness on discrim-
inating fake AV webpages from benign ones. The proposed features are categorized into
three classes, which characterize three aspects critical to the success of a fake AV attack
respectively.
• Human-Perception Features: Fake AV webpages need to impersonate identities of
authentic anti-virus products. Features in this class therefore characterize textual and
visual identities that are used by attackers to trick users into trusting the authenticity
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of the fake AV webpages.
• Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Features: Search engines become a major
method for attackers to disseminate fake AV webpages. Hence, fake AV webpages
actively promote their rankings in search engine results. Features in this class profile
webpage elements (e.g., security keywords in URL and webpage source code) that
can be used for boosting the search rankings of fake AV webpages.
• Networking Features: Attackers actively increase the resilience of their networking
infrastructures against legal disruption efforts. Features in this category describe how
attackers employ service redirection and domain-/fast-flux to improve the agility of
their network infrastructures used by fake AV webpages.
3.3.3.1 Human-Perception Features
In our current implementation, DART bootstraps from a Wseed with 51 words. The DISCO
API enlarges the set to 510 words. By performing LSA analysis on a large corpus of
10.9 million tweets, DART yields 1050 security keywords (i.e., Wsecurity). Table 3.1
presents examples of security keywords that are discovered in the three steps, respectively.
Specifically, the keywords (i.e., “firewall”, “privacy”, and, “anti-spyware”) triggered by
DISCO method present the most widely stuffed keywords within a fake AV webpage. The
trendy security keywords (e.g., “KeyBoy”, “scareware”, and “typosquatting”) might re-
flect trendy topics in which Internet users are interested with respective to fake AV software
or cyber attacks.
Since the success of a fake AV attack requires the explicit approval of an end user,
fake AV webpages need to convince end users that they offer authentic anti-virus products.
Practically, attackers usually embed the textual and visual identities of the impersonated
anti-virus products in fake AV webpages. In addition, names of emerging malware threats
are also adopted by attackers to “scare” end users [67] and stimulate their installation ac-
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Figure 3.4: Examples of icons from authentic
AV software; Reprinted from [38]
Figure 3.5: Image similarity between an authentic McAfee image (Left) and fake one
(Right); Reprinted from [38]
tions. Accordingly, we propose three features to characterize such observations.
• Feature 1: Image Identity. This feature quantifies the extent to which the images
loaded by a landing page are similar to those images of the authentic anti-virus web-
pages. Specifically, DART aggregates all images loaded by a landing page into a
set denoted as Vweb. Given a set of images (Vauth) composed of authentic anti-virus
logos or icons, DART enumerates each pair of images vi and vj where vi ∈ Vweb
and vj ∈ Vauth, and then computes their similarity score using an image similar-
ity function denoted as similar(). The visual identity feature for a landing page is
represented by the maximum value of similarity scores.
Since the visual identities (e.g., the icons) of authentic anti-virus webpages are rel-
atively stable, it is practically feasible to manually collect their representative images.
Specifically, we used Wikipedia to collect the logos and icons of all anti-virus compa-
nies according to the Open Directory Project [60], resulting in 56 images belonging to
Vauth since it guaranteed that we can find the high resolution images which are identi-
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cal with those from authentic anti-virus webpages. Fig. 3.4 presents several examples.
Since images loaded by landing pages (i.e., images belonging to Vweb) usually have poorer
resolutions compared to those from authentic anti-virus webpages, we use a normalized
RGB based histogram [29] and Bhattacharyya measure [7] to calculate a similarity score
between the probability distribution of images. Fig. 3.5 presents an example of image
similarity measurement: even if two images of the same visual identity exhibit disparate
resolution, DART can still yield a high similarity score of approximately 0.9345. Fig. 3.6
presents the distribution of values for the image identity feature with respect to fake AV,
benign (security-popular), benign (security-unpopular), and benign (security-irrelevant):
more than 90% benign (security-popular) have feature values higher than 0.97, and fake
AV landing webpages also have high similarity value 0.88; comparatively, the majority of
benign (security-irrelevant) and benign (security-unpopular) have small values for this fea-
ture. We assumed that fake AV attackers can copy images from third parties or authentic
AV webpages and reused them on their local hosting. Thus, it is not surprising that the
feature value for fake AV webpages have high similarity value. Despite this, it is worth
noting that this feature takes advantage of differentiating between fake AV webpages and
legitimate ones (i.e., webpages in Ssecurity−irrelevant or Ssecurity−unpopular) in terms of image
similarity.
Commercial webpages usually embed their textual identities in the domain names of
their landing pages, and authentic anti-virus webpages are not exceptions. Particularly, se-
curity vendors usually position their textual identities in their second-level domains. The
first row of Table 3.2 presents a few domain names from several authentic anti-virus landing
pages, where their textual identities such as “avast” and “norton” reside in the second-level
domains. Attackers can leverage the same way for deception. However, unlike authen-
tic anti-virus webpages, fake AV webpages tend to embed textual identities in lower-level
domains for a number of reasons. First, the second-level domain with textual identities usu-
ally have been registered by security vendors. Second, many fake AV webpages are hosted
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Figure 3.6: Image Identity Feature;
Reprinted from [38]
Categories Domain Examples
Authentic AV
http://us.norton.com
http://www.pandasecurity.com
http://www.avast.com
http://www.avg.com
Fake AV
http://norton-antivirus.en.softonic.com
http://panda.brothersoft.com
http://avast.softpedia.com
http://avg-antivirus-free.soft32.com
Table 3.2: Domain examples for authentic
and fake anti-virus landing pages; Reprinted
from [38]
in public hosting service [10], [70], [71], and their second-level domains are managed by
various hosting services. Third, mobile devices such as tablets and smart-phones usually
have limited space in browser address bar to display domains, and hence the low-level do-
mains are more likely to be presented to end users. Attackers can take advantage of such
limitation and deliberately embed textual identities in low-level domains to mislead mobile
device users [4]. The second row of Table 3.2 illustrates a few examples of fake AV landing
pages domains, where the textual identities such as “avast” and “norton” appear in the 3-
or 4-level domains. In addition, textual identities are also frequently presented in the texts
and images of fake AV landing pages after they are fully loaded. We therefore design two
features, including domain identity and content identity to characterize our
observations.
• Feature 2: Domain Identity. We split the domain name of a visited landing page
into tokens by the delimiter “.”, where each token defines a single level of the do-
main name and the level increases from right to left. The rightmost level is cor-
responding to the 1-level domain (a.k.a., top-level domain). We identify all tokens
that contain any word in Wsecurity and then accumulate their levels as the value for
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Reprinted from [38]
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Figure 3.8: Content Identity Feature;
Reprinted from [38]
this feature. For instance, the domain name for a fake AV website “www.norton-
antivirus.en.softonic.com” contains textual identities “norton” and “antivirus” in the
4th level domain, resulting in a value of 8 for its feature.
• Feature 3: Content Identity. Although we can directly extract security keywords
from preserved source codes for all webpages associated with a landing page, many
security keywords are dynamically generated (e.g., by JavaScript) or actually pre-
sented in images. Therefore, DART performs Optical Character Recognition [59]
analysis on the snapshot of the fully loaded landing page and extract all words. The
value of this feature represents the total occurrence of words that belong to Wsecurity.
Fig. 3.7 presents the distribution of the values of the domain identity feature for fake
AV, benign (security-popular, security-unpopular, and security-irrelevant) webpages, re-
spectively. As indicated in the distribution, more than 93% fake AV webpages have feature
values higher than 15 while larger than 97% benign (security-popular), benign (security-
unpopular), and benign (security-irrelevant) have their domain features lower than 5. It
showed that most fake AV webpages indeed commonly embed security keywords in their
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Reprinted from [38]
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Figure 3.10: Content Keyword Feature;
Reprinted from [38]
lower-level domains. Fig. 3.8 compares content identity feature for fake AV webpages,
benign (security-popular), benign (security-irrelevant), and benign (security-unpopular)
webpages, where fake AV webpages present much more security keywords to end users
compared to other webpages.
3.3.3.2 Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Features
While it is critical for attackers to trick users into installing fake anti-virus software, how to
ensure a fake AV webpage has the chance to be visited by end users is equally important.
Search Engine Optimization (SEO) is widely used by attackers to accomplish this objective.
As search engines often give heavy weight for keywords in both URLs and contents of
webpages, it becomes a common practice to embed in them with security keywords [36].
We accordingly design two features to characterize such observation.
• Feature 4: Path Keywords. DART divides the path of a URL into tokens using the
delimiter “/” from left to right, where each token usually represents a directory in
the web server. For example, “Spyware” resides in the 2nd level of the fake AV
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URL “www.xyz.com/Antivirus/Spyware/Dist/worm.html”. Second, we accumulate
the levels of directories that contain security keywords from Wsecurity. For instance,
suppose {antivirus, spyware, worm} ⊂ Wsecurity, the value of this feature for the
aforementioned URL will be 7 since 1st, 2nd, and 4th directories contain “Antivirus”,
“Spyware”, and “worm”, respectively.
• Feature 5: Content Keywords. Words in the webpage source codes are commonly
employed for search engine for the webpage indexing. Attackers excessively tend to
inject words of various security semantics into the webpage source codes, which can
be easily analyzed by search engines. This feature represents the occurrence of words
belonging to Wsecurity in the source codes of a landing page and all other webpages
loaded by it.
Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10 present the distribution of these two features, respectively. As
indicated in these figures, fake AV webpages tend to have much more security keywords in
both URL paths and webpage source codes.
3.3.3.3 Networking Features
Attackers strive to make their networking infrastructures resilient against legal disruption
efforts. Two networking-level strategies are commonly adopted. First, attackers usually use
service redirection (by either standard HTTP redirection protocols or executable scripts) to
obfuscate the locations of web servers that actually offer malicious services. Specifically,
upon visiting a fake AV landing page, the browser might be redirected through a chain of
redirection servers before it reaches at the server that hosts malicious contents such as the
malicious binaries for download. Compromised hosts (e.g., bots), which are distributed
over the Internet, are often employed by attackers as redirection servers [90] [43]. Con-
sequently, a fake AV landing page may redirect the browser to traverse a large number
of networks, which can be characterized by networking Autonomous System Numbers
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(ASNs), before its content is fully loaded. Second, fast- and domain-flux techniques are
widely used to improve the agility of malicious networking infrastructures [90]. On the
one hand, a collection of IP addresses can be registered for the same fake AV domain, and
thus even if a portion of the IP addresses (and their associated servers) are disrupted, the
remaining ones can still provide malicious services. On the other hand, a set of fake AV
landing pages controlled by the same attacker can be hosted in the same server (i.e., the
domain names will be mapped to the same IP address). In this case, even if certain do-
mains are taken down, others can still function. Therefore, if two domains (say di and dj)
corresponding to two fake AV landing pages are under the control of the same attacker, it is
highly likely that their resolved IPs (say IPSeti and IPSetj) tend to have certain overlap
(i.e., |IPSeti ∩ IPSetj| > 0). In other words, if di has been identified as a domain used
for a fake AV attack, its maliciousness can be “propogated” to dj due to the overlap of their
IP addresses. Moreover, a large IP-set overlap between di and dj , which can be measured
by |IPSeti ∩ IPSetj|/|IPSeti ∪ IPSetj|, indicates a high possibility that dj is used for
malicious purpose. In this section, we propose two features that aim at profiling the service
redirection and quantifying the maliciousness propagation.
• Feature 6: Redirection. For each webpage that is triggered by rendering the landing
page, DART identifies the IP address(es) for the domain name in its URL and sub-
sequently acquires the Autonomous System Number(s) (ASN) for the IP address(es)
using public IP-to-ASN services [20]. This operation will result in a set of ASNs,
which is denoted as ASNAll. If we denote the set of ASN(s) for the landing page
as ASNLanding (ASNLanding ⊆ ASNAll), then the value of this feature is defined as
|ASNAll−ASNLanding |
|ASNAll|
.
• Feature 7: Maliciousness Score. An increasing number of domains are created and
registered by attackers for malicious users such as fake AV webpages. The malicious
score is to quantify the maliciousness of a collection of observed domains (denoted
as Dobserved) given their correlation with a set of known fake-AV domains (denoted
50
as Dseed). We start by merging Dobserved and Dseed into a set of domains denoted
as D = {d1, d2, ..., dn}. We then collect the IP address(es) for each domain di,
we collect its IP addresses (denoted as IPSeti) by issuing DNS queries. We then
construct a matrix R = {ri,j}n×n, where ri,j = |IPSeti ∩ IPSetj|/|IPSeti ∪
IPSetj| ∈ [0, 1]. This matrix can be considered as an undirected graph G, where
each node is corresponding to a domain. Two nodes, di and dj , will share an edge if
ri,j > 0, where ri,j can represent the weight for this edge. Accordingly, Rd quantifies
the aggregated weights for two nodes (i.e., domains) to be connected through exact
d hops. We initialize a vector S0 = {si}n×1, where si = 1 if di ∈ Dseed and si = 0
otherwise.
Sk =
d=k∑
d=1
Rd · S0 (3.1)
Rd · S0 indicates that we propagate the maliciousness of known fake AV domains
to other domains that are d hops away from them. Hence, Sk accumulates the mali-
ciousness score of a domain that is propagated from known malicious domains that
are at most k hops away. If the maliciousness score for a domain exceeds 1, we will
set it as 1 to prevent the maliciousness score from growing to infinity.
Fig. 3.11 shows the distribution of the redirection feature for fake AV, benign (security-
popular), benign (security-unpopular), and benign (security-irrelevant) webpages respec-
tively. The comparison indicates that fake AV webpages indeed involve more diverse
networks for redirection than other webpages. Certain benign (security-popular), benign
(security-unpopular) and benign (security-irrelevant) have the feature values greater than
0.8, where our manual analysis revealed that some of benign (security-popular), benign
(security-irrelevant), and benign (security-unpopular) massively integrated advertising con-
tents from numerous networks.
In order to evaluate the maliciousness score feature, we need to first obtain Dseed,
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Figure 3.11: Redirection Feature; Reprinted
from [38]
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Figure 3.12: Maliciousness Score Feature;
Reprinted from [38]
which contains domains that have been known to be used for fake antivirus webpages.
However, since Sfake represents the ground truth, we have known that all domains in-
volved in the landing pages belonging to Sfake are used for fake AV webpages. In order to
evaluate the effectiveness of this feature, we pretend that only a portion of landing pages
domains in Sfake are known to be malicious. Specifically, we randomly selected 10%
of the landing pages in Sfake and aggregate their domains into Dseed. The domains of
remaining 90% landing pages are aggregated into Dobserved. Fig. 3.12 presents the distri-
bution of the maliciousness score feature for fake AV, benign (security-popular), benign
(security-irrelevant), and benign (security-unpopular) webpages given Dseed, where we set
k = 10. As indicated in the figure, approximately 90% of benign (security-popular), benign
(security-unpopular), and benign (security-irrelevant) webpages have maliciousness scores
lower than 0.2 for their domains. Comparatively, domains of fake AV webpages tend to
have overlaps with each other with respect to the sets of IP addresses, thereby resulting
in high maliciousness scores for their domains. For example, more than 60% of fake AV
webpages have maliciousness scores higher than 0.2.
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3.4 Evaluation
We have performed extensive evaluation of DART, which focuses on the overall detection
performance, the detection accuracy when only light-weight features are employed, the
relative importance of the designed features, and the correlation among these features.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
Since DART adopts statistical classifiers to integrate various features for detection, evalu-
ating DART implies that a dataset has relatively balanced benign and malicious samples.
To this end, we use all 1,230 fake AV webpages in Sfake as malicious samples. The total
number of benign samples (i.e., |Ssecurity−popular ∪ Ssecurity−unpopular ∪ Ssecurity−irrelevant|)
is much larger than |Sfake|, where Ssecurity−unpopular contribute most of the benign samples.
Therefore, we randomly sample 538 webpages from Ssecurity−unpopular, where 538 is actu-
ally the size of |Ssecurity−irrelevant|. We then aggregate Ssecurity−popular, Ssecurity−irrelevant,
and these 538 webpages randomly selected from Ssecurity−unpopular into Sbenign. Hence,
Sbenign, together with Sfake, forms an approximately balanced evaluation dataset (i.e.,
|Sbenign| = 1286 and |Sfake| = 1, 230), and meanwhile experiences significant diversity.
3.4.2 Experimental Results
3.4.2.1 Detection Accuracy
We equipped DART with the Random Forest statistical classifier and evaluated its detection
accuracy. We utilized 10-fold cross-validation, where we randomly partition the data set
into 10 folds and then employ 9 folds for training and the remaining 1 fold for fake AV web-
pages detection. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is presented in Fig. 3.13 and
it demonstrated that the features used by DART can achieve high detection accuracy when
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Figure 3.13: ROC comparison between light-weight and all features; Reprinted from [38]
they are integrated by a statistical classifier for detection. For example, given a false posi-
tive rate of 0.2%, the Random Forest classifier can achieve a high detection rate of 90.4%.
To measure DART that can distinguish fake AV from security-popular (Ssecurity−popular)
webpages, we check the false positive rate for security-popular and fake AV webpages.
Note that the false positive rate is defined as the fraction of all security-popular webpages
classified as fake AV ones. The low false positive rate in Table 3.3 is achieved by the
Random Forest using all the features or light-weight features on the dataset Sfake and
Ssecurity−popular. The result indicates that the 0.4% of false positive rates are acceptable
for DART to detect fake AV webpages in the Internet. We also evaluated the sensitivity of
DART to the selection of statistical classifiers. Specifically, we used both Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and Gradient-Boosted Tree [31] to perform 10-fold cross-validation. Both
classifiers accomplished high detection accuracy comparable to the Random Forest classi-
fier, where their area under the ROC curve (AUC) values are summarized in Table 3.4. This
experimental result demonstrated that proposed features are not sensitive to the selection
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7 Features Light-Weight only
Random Forest 0.004 0.009
Table 3.3: False positive rates for Security-popular and Fake AV webpages; Reprinted
from [38]
SVM Gradient-Boosted Tree Random Forest
AUC 0.997 0.998 0.999
Table 3.4: AUC for each classifier; Reprinted from [38]
of statistical classifiers.
3.4.2.2 Detection Accuracy Using Light-Weight Features
Although the integration of these features results in high detection accuracy, extracting
certain features actually implies high computational costs and may introduce significant
delays when a large number of webpages are analyzed. Specifically, the image identity
feature mandates the similarity measurement between each icon from all authentic anti-
virus webpages and every image of an unknown webpage; the content identity requires
OCR analysis for each unknown webpage, which is computationally expensive; calculating
the value of the IP-overlap feature needs to perform pairwise IP-set interaction between
each labelled webpage and the unknown webpage as well as iterative matrix multiplication.
As a consequence, it may become a performance bottleneck when DART is used for the
environments where efficiency becomes a concern (e.g., used by mainstream search engines
to analyze a massive number of webpages).
In order to address this challenge, DART can selectively employ light-weight features
for detection. Specifically, the domain identity, path keywords, and content keywords only
require text-based comparison while AS redirection merely needs ASN lookups. We have
evaluated the detection accuracy of DART when only these features are used and presented
the detection result in Fig. 3.13. Despite the fact that the light-weight features lead to
slightly lower detection accuracy (e.g., 87.5% detection rate given the false positive rate of
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Domain Identity Path Keywords Content Keywords Redirection
Time 6.52% 9.51% 25% 58.97%
Table 3.5: A percentage of average computation time for each of light-weight features;
Reprinted from [38]
Feature Variable importance Decrease of detection rate
Domain Identity 7.981 0.537
Content Identity 6.178 0.418
Content Keywords 5.401 0.365
Path Keywords 5.297 0.358
Maliciousness score 3.272 0.221
Image Identity 2.796 0.139
Redirection 1.182 0.080
Table 3.6: Rank of feature importance in DART; variable importance is measured as the
mean decrease in accuracy and features with large variable importance are more influential
for classification of the data; Reprinted from [38]
0.2%) compared to all features, the time used for detection has been tremendously reduced.
To be specific, the average detection time has been reduced from 5.5 minutes to 36.8 sec-
onds for each webpage. In addition, if a false positive rate of 0.5% is tolerable, we can
obtain approximately 90% detection rate.
In spite of the huge reduction for time consumption, 36.8 seconds are not negligible.
It is mainly attributed to our implementation, which is not fully optimized. For example, all
features are sequentially generated; keyword identification is implemented using the most
basic substring matching; identifying ASNs relies third-party IP-to-ASN service where
network interactions are involved. We present the percentage of time consumption for
each light-weight feature in Table 3.5, where Redirection dominates the time consumption
(i.e., about 84% of total average computation time) since network interactions are involved.
Nevertheless, these light-weight features enable significant room for performance improve-
ment. For example, a fast substring matching algorithm and a local IP-to-ASN database
would fundamentally decrease the time consumption. We will take the performance opti-
mization as our future work.
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Figure 3.14: Correlation matrix of detection features; Reprinted from [38]
3.4.2.3 Feature Importance and Correlation
We explored the relative importance of the proposed features in the context of Random For-
est classifier, which has accomplished the best detection accuracy according to our exper-
iments. Specifically, we conducted variable importance measurements [9] for our features
using permutation test of Random Forest function for feature selection [45]. The variable
importance for each feature is presented in the second column of Table 3.6. In addition,
we evaluate the decrease of the detection rate (given a fixed false positive rate of 0.2%)
of DART in absence of each feature, which is presented in the third column of Table 3.6.
Furthermore, the results have demonstrated that the light-weight features tend to contribute
more to the detection accuracy. Specifically, Domain Identity and Content Keywords fea-
tures demonstrate high detection ability since the decrease rates of the two features (0.537
and 0.365, respectively) indeed rank 1st and 3rd among all features.
We also evaluated the correlation among various features, where the correlation im-
plies the extent to which a feature might be redundant given other features. Two strategies
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have been adopted. First, we used the correlation matrix to identify if correlated predictors
exist in the features, where each element in the matrix represents the Pearson’s r correlation
coefficient [44] of two features. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient r ∈ [−1, 1] of two
features P and Q can be defined as
r =
∑
(P − P̄ )(Q− Q̄)√∑
(P − P̄ )2
√∑
(Q− Q̄)2
(3.2)
where P̄ and Q̄ denote the means of the two features. Fig. 3.14 shows that the majority of
features are not linearly correlated to other features. For example, a pair of two features
(Path Keywords, Domain Identity) represents that the highest negative correlation score is
0.39 and the highest positive correlation between Content Keywords and Domain Identity
is at most 0.15.
Second, we performed Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which can be used to
analyze correlation between variables with respect to the variance of the data [37]. We pre-
sented our evaluation results using PCA variable factor map [64] in Figure 3.15. In a factor
map, an arrow represents a feature. The angle between the two arrows of features explains
the relative correlation of the respective features on the first two principal components.
Specifically, if the angle between the two arrows is close to 90 degrees, the corresponding
features are not correlated. As illustrated in Figure 3.15, the angles between majority of
features approximate 90 degrees (e.g., Content Identity and Redirection onto the principal
component 2 space), implying a weak correlation between features. According to the cor-
relation matrix and PCA variable factor map, we concluded that most of the features tend
to be linearly independent.
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Figure 3.15: Detection features factor map: Projection of coordinates of 7 features on the
PCA variable factor map; Reprinted from [38]
3.5 Discussion
Attackers may attempt to evade our detection after they know the design of DART, which
represents a general challenge for all detection systems. Specifically, attackers can delib-
erately design their fake AV webpages so that the feature values of these webpages are
indistinguishable from those of benign ones. However, since DART’s detection features
characterize elements of fake AV webpages that are critical to the success of attacks, ma-
nipulating such elements may fundamentally constrain the attack effectiveness. For exam-
ple, attackers can significantly reduce visual and textual identities in fake AV webpages
to disrupt the human-perception features, while it would decrease the possibility to con-
vince end users to install fake anti-virus binaries. In addition, attackers can also abandon
SEO techniques to make the SEO features ineffective. Unfortunately, this strategy will
tremendously lower the ranks of fake AV webpages in search engine results, thereby intrin-
sically diminishing their exposure to end users. Further, attackers could organize a fake AV
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landing page and its associated webpages in the hosts belonging to the same autonomous
system. Unfortunately, achieving this objective will impair the agility and robustness of
their networking infrastructures against legal disruption efforts. Attackers may also parti-
tion different landing pages to distinct network infrastructures that share little overlap of
IP addresses. Nevertheless, it necessitates a large amount of network resources (e.g., IP
addresses) from attackers especially when the number of fake AV landing pages grows.
Although our goal of this work is focused on detecting fake AV webpages, the pro-
posed methods and features could be adopted to detect other types of malicious webpages.
Specifically, since the networking features are independent to webpage content, they can
be used to detect all types of malicious webpages. Other features are relevant to the con-
text of antivirus software. For example, all keywords are related to virus or antivirus; all
images are related to icons of popular antivirus software. Therefore, directly using these
features to detect other malicious webpages is unlikely to work. However, one can modify
the seed data (e.g., the keywords and icons) to detect other types of malicious webpages.
For example, we can use the keywords and icons related to bank, in order to detect phishing
websites related to finance. In addition, the method to propagate maliciousness score from
known malicious domains to unknown domains based on their correlation can be used to
detect malicious domains beyond fake AV webpages. For example, we can use this method
to detect botnet C&C domains that use domain-flux [87] techniques.
Similar to many methods of detecting malicious webpages, DART can be deployed
as a crawler to detect fake AV webpages proactively, helping a variety of critical Internet
services such as search engine and social networks. Although the current average detection
time (36 seconds) makes DART unlikely to be directly deployed in end users’ browsers, we
still envision such possibility after optimizing its implementation (e.g., parallelizing fea-
ture extraction and using fast algorithms). Systematically reducing system overhead and
increasing scalability are definitely of great importance for detection systems and improv-
ing DART towards this direction falls in our future work.
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3.6 Summary
This chapter presents a novel system, DART, to automatically detect fake AV webpages.
DART leverages three categories of features including human-perception features, SEO
features, and networking features. Deriving these features necessitates our knowledge of
diverse and trendy security keywords, which has been accomplished by performing seman-
tic analysis based on messages from social networks. Experimental results based on real
fake AV webpages collected from the Internet have demonstrated the detection accuracy
of DART, which has achieved a high detection rate of 90.4% given an extremely low false
positive rate of 0.2%. In addition, statistical analysis has revealed that the proposed features
complement to each as they tend to be linearly independent. Further, Since these features
characterize the elements in a fake AV webpage that is critical to its success, circumventing
these features will fundamentally limit the effectiveness of fake AV attacks.
In the future work, we plan to extend DART more scalable to analyze large-scale fake
AV webpages whose the volume of features keeps growing over time. In particular, the
possible direction is to use a distributed computing technique such as MapReduce to carry
out big-data processing. Another option would be valuable to design a novel automated
browser with respect to labelling fake AV webpages and downloading binary files. Lastly,
we will explore new approaches to detect foreign languages fake AV webpages as part of
our future work.
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Chapter 4: Detecting Malicious
Accounts for Online Promotions in
Social Network
4.1 Motivation
In the chapter 4, we will discuss a new challenge to detect malicious OSN accounts that
participate in online promotion events. Since OSNs provide a platform to support not only
socializing but also sharing of users’ information, the OSN application is also becoming
increasingly popular. Specifically, an OSN account which integrates with financial activ-
ities is commonly associate with accounts for both online banking and virtual currency.
Figure 4.1 presents such an example, where a QQ account, the most popular OSN account
of Tencent in China, is associated with an online banking account for real currency and a
virtual account for virtual currency (i.e., Q coin). As shown in Figure 4.1, an OSN user
(i.e., a QQ user) has two methods to recharge his/her virtual currency account: i) online
banking and ii) online promotion event. Through online banking services, the OSN user
can directly deposit real currency into his/her online banking account and then he/she can
recharge his/her virtual currency account from his/her banking account. Alternatively, the
OSN user who participates online promotion events, can also recharge his/her virtual cur-
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Figure 4.1: The integration of OSN accounts and financial accounts; Reprinted from [92]
rency account by collecting rewards from the promotion events. Then, the user can expend
from his/her account in two typical ways. First, he/she can use real or virtual currency to
buy both real and virtual goods (e.g., via online shopping). Second, he/she can transfer
both real and virtual currency to another user by sending out gifts.
As discussed in Section 1.2, attackers could control a large number of accounts, ei-
ther by registering new accounts or compromising existing accounts, to participate in the
online promotion events for virtual currency. We found that the security risk posed by
the use of OSN accounts in terms of online promotion events is feasible in general. Fig-
ure 4.2 presents the typical virtual currency flow when malicious accounts participate in
online promotion events. The flow is composed of three phases including i) collecting, ii)
multi-layer transferring, and iii) laundering the virtual currency. In first phase, an attacker
controls a set of accounts to participate in online business promotion activities and each ac-
count possibly gets a certain amount of virtual currency as return. In the second phase, the
attacker will instrument these currency-collection accounts to transfer the virtual currency
to other accounts. Multiple layers of transferring activities might be involved to obfuscate
the identities of malicious accounts used for participating online promotion activities. At
the end of the second phase, a large amount of virtual currency will be aggregated into a few
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Figure 4.2: Virtual Currency Flow for Malicious OSN Accounts; Reprinted from [92]
laundering accounts. In the third phase, the attacker will control the laundering accounts to
trade the virtual currency into real cash by selling it to individual buyers. Attackers usually
employ two methods to solicit individual buyers including sending spams and advertising
through major e-commerce websites such as www.taobao.com and www.tmall.com. In or-
der to compete with regulated sources for virtual currency (i.e., purchasing virtual currency
using real currency), attackers usually offer a considerable discount. Our objective is to de-
sign a detection system capable of identifying malicious accounts that participate in online
promotion events for virtual currency collection (at the collection phase) before rewards
are committed.
In Section 4.2, we remark that the existing techniques may not effective for identifying
such malicious OSN accounts with the high detection accuracy.
4.2 Related Work
We review some of the existing works on spammer detection across online social networks
(OSNs). Effective extracting of detection features from the sources for spammer detection
plays an important role in OSNs. Therefore, selection of appropriate features is vital as it
could lead to detection performance. In this section, we also review some of the currently
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available financial fraud detection methods.
4.2.1 Spammer Detection
Since online social networks play an increasing important role in both cyber and business
world, detecting malicious users in OSNs becomes of great importance. Many detection
methods have been consequently proposed [35, 34, 14, 13, 25, 12, 86, 54]. Considering
the popularity of spammers in OSNs, these methods almost exclusively focus on detecting
accounts that send malicious content. A spamming attack can be considered as an informa-
tion flow initiated from an attacker, through a series of malicious accounts, and finally to
a victim account. Despite the diversity of these methods, they generally leverage partial or
all of three sources for detection including i) the content of the spam message, ii) the net-
work infrastructure that hosts the malicious information (e.g., phishing content or exploits),
and iii) the social structure among malicious accounts and victim accounts. For example,
Gao et al. [28] designed a method to reveal campaigns of malicious accounts by clustering
accounts that send messages with similar content. Lee et al. [43] devised a method to first
track HTTP redirection chains initiated from URLs embedded in an OSN message, then
group messages that lead to webpages hosted in the same server, and finally use the server
reputation to identify malicious accounts. Yang et al. [88] extracted a graph from the “fol-
lowing” relationship of twitter accounts and then propagate maliciousness score using the
derived graph. Wu et al. [86] proposed a social spammer and spam message co-detection
method based on the posting relations between users and messages, and utilized the re-
lationship among user and message to improve the performance of both social spammer
detection.
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4.2.2 Fraud Detection
Detecting fraudulent activities in financial transactions has also attracted significant re-
search efforts [1, 81]. For example, Olszewski et al. [58] represented the user account
records in 2-dimensional space of the Self-Organizing Map grid, and proposed a detection
method based on threshold-type binary classification algorithm to solve problems of credit
card fraud and telecommunications fraud. Lin et al. [48] ranked the importance of fraud
factors used in financial statement fraud detection, and investigated the correct classifica-
tion rates of three algorithms including Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, and Artificial
Neural Networks. Throckmorton et al. [77] proposed a corporate financial fraud detection
method based on combined features of financial numbers, linguistic behavior, and non-
verbal vocal.
4.2.3 Limitations
Based on the literature survey presented here, the existing methods are limited to the fol-
lowing.
1. It is difficult that the proposed approaches for spammer detection in OSNs detect
malicious OSN accounts participating in online promotion activities. Different from
traditional spammer accounts, neither do the OSN accounts with financial activi-
ties utilize spamming messages, nor require any malicious network infrastructures
to spread malwares and launch illicit activities automatically. In addition, these ac-
counts don’t necessarily rely on social connection for i) users and users (i.e., user-
user relations); ii) users and messages (i.e., user-message relations); and iii) OSN
messages (i.e., message-message relations).
2. Compared to the studied financial fraud detection problems, account behaviors of
collecting and using the virtual currency in online promotion activities are almost
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completely different with traditional financial systems since they do not only involve
financial activities but also networking and online promotion activities. In this case,
it is hard to develop new and more robust features to detect any financial fraud based
on the traditional detection solutions.
These present new challenges to directly making use of existing methods for effective
malicious accounts detection in OSNs with online promotion events. To overcome those
limitations, in this dissertation, we address a new problem caused by new trend of integrat-
ing online social networks and financial activities and propose a novel system, ProGuard to
automatically detect malicious OSN accounts that participate in online promotion events.
4.3 System
4.3.1 Collecting & Labeling Data
We have collected labelled data from Tencent QQ, a leading Chinese online social network
that offers a variety of services such as instant message, voice chat, online games, online
shopping, and e-commerce. All these services support the usage of the Q coin, the virtual
currency distributed and managed by Tencent QQ. Tencent QQ has a giant body of 899
million active QQ accounts with a reportedly peak of 176.4 million simultaneous online
QQ users. Tencent QQ is one of the global leading OSNs that are actively involved in
virtual-currency-based online promotion activities. We collect total 56,000 OSN accounts.
Our data set is composed of 28,000 malicious accounts and 28,000 benign accounts, where
all of these accounts are randomly sampled from the accounts that participated in Tencent
QQ online promotion activities in August 2015. The labeling process starts from identi-
fying laundering accounts (i.e., accounts that are associated with virtual currency spams
and accounts that sell virtual currency in major e-commerce websites). Specifically, if an
account transfers virtual currency to any account that engages in virtual-money laundering
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activities, this account will be labeled as malicious. Such “trace-back” process may involve
multiple layers of transferring, which is visualized at the bottom in Figure 4.2. It is worth
noting that although both malicious and benign accounts are labelled based on their activi-
ties in Phase-2 (i.e., currency transferring) and Phase-3 (i.e., laundering), the data used for
building the detection system are collected before the launch of the online promotion event.
The reason is that the objective of our detection system is to identify malicious accounts
before the rewards are committed. The top of Figure 4.3 presents the temporal relation-
ship among the data collection process, online promotion events, and the account labeling
process. Therefore, it is worth noting that an account may not have any historical financial
activities (even for virtual currency collection activities) since it participates in the online
promotion for the first time.
Feature 
Extractor
Statistical 
Classifier
Malicious
Benign
Labelling malicious & benign
accountsCollecting labelled data
An online promotion event
Time
Labelled data prior to the event
Figure 4.3: The Architectural Overview of the System; Reprinted from [92]
Although the aforementioned “trace-back” method is effective in manually labeling
malicious accounts, using it as a detection method is impractical. First, it requires a tremen-
dous amount of manual efforts for forensic analysis such as identifying suspicious virtual-
currency dealers in external e-commerce websites, correlating spamming contents with
user accounts, and correlating sellers’ profiles with user accounts. In addition, evidence for
such forensic analysis will be only available after malicious accounts participate in online
promotion events. Therefore, this data labeling process, if used as detection method, cannot
68
guide business entities to mitigate their financial loss proactively. In contrast, our method is
designed to detect malicious accounts prior to the reward commitment. For each account,
we collect a variety of information including 1) login activities, 2) a list of anonymized
accounts that this account has sent instant messages to, 3) service purchase activities, 4)
the recharging activities, and 5) the expenditure activities.
4.3.2 System Design
ProGuard is composed of two phases, namely the training phase and the detection phase.
In the training phase, a statistical classifier is learnt from a set of pre-labelled malicious
and benign accounts. In the detection phase, an unknown account will first be converted
to a feature vector and then analyzed by the statistical classifier to assess its maliciousness.
The bottom of Figure 4.3 presents the architectural overview of ProGuard. As a variety
of statistical classifiers have been developed and widely used, designing features which
is capable of discriminating between malicious accounts and benign accounts becomes of
central focus. In this section, we will introduce various features and demonstrate their
effectiveness on differentiating malicious accounts from benign ones. We propose three
general guidelines to steer the feature design.
• General Behaviors: Benign accounts are usually used by regular users for variety
of activities such as chatting, photo sharing, and financial activities. In contrast, ma-
licious accounts are more likely to be driven by online promotion events. Therefore,
the benign accounts tend to be more socially active compared to malicious accounts.
• Currency Collection: The malicious accounts under investigation focus on using
online promotion activities to collect virtual currency. In contrast, benign users are
likely to obtain virtual currency from multiple resources.
• Currency Usage: Attackers’ ultimate objective is to monetize the virtual currency.
In contrast, benign users use their virtual currency in much more diversified ways.
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Figure 4.4: Feature 1 - The Ratio of Active Days; Reprinted from [92]
4.3.2.1 General-Behavior Features
Malicious accounts tend to be less active compared to benign accounts with respect to
the non-financial usage. Attackers usually control their accounts to only participate in
online promotion activities. In contrast, benign accounts are more likely to engage in active
interaction with other users.
• Feature 1: The Ratio of Active Days. This feature represents the ratio of the number
of active days of an account for the passed one year. Specifically, if an account is
logged in at least once for a day, this day will be labeled as “active” for this account.
Attackers usually login malicious accounts for participating in online promotion ac-
tivities that involve virtual currency. Therefore, malicious accounts tend to be silent in the
absence of online promotion activities. The availability of promotion activities is signifi-
cantly influenced by timing and spatial factors. For example, promotion activities are inten-
sive over holiday seasons, special dates, and regional events while occasionally available
for other time periods. As a consequence, malicious accounts tend to be inactive generally.
Comparatively, benign accounts are used by regular users and their logins are driven by the
daily usage such as chatting and photo sharing. Many users configure their applications
to automatically login upon the bootstrap of the underlying system (e.g., a smartphone),
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which further facilitates volatility of benign accounts. Figure 4.4 presents the distribution
of feature values for both malicious accounts and benign accounts. As illustrated in the fig-
ure, the vast majority of malicious accounts (i.e., approximately 98% of malicious accounts
) are active for less than 20% of total days whereas only a small percentage of benign ac-
counts (i.e., less than 20%) experience the same active level (i.e., being active for less than
20% of one year).
• Feature 2 : The Number of Friends. This feature summarizes the number of friends
for each account.
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Figure 4.5: Feature 2 - The Number of Friends for An Account; Reprinted from [92]
As a common feature for almost all online social networks, each OSN account has
a list of friends. It usually implies a considerable amount of user-user interaction for one
user to add another one as her friend. It is common for a benign user to maintain a rel-
atively lengthy friend list for various social activities such as chatting and photo sharing.
In contrast, an attacker usually lacks the motivation to maintain a friend list since it con-
tributes little to promotion participation but costs significant efforts such as solving captcha
challenges. Figure 4.5 presents the distribution of values for this feature, where malicious
accounts tend to have much less friends compared to benign accounts. Specifically, ap-
proximately 80% of malicious accounts have less than 40 friends while about 70% benign
accounts have more than 200 friends.
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• Feature 3: The Number of Services Purchased By An Account. This feature repre-
sents the total number of types of upgraded membership that an account has paid for
through all possible methods.
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Figure 4.6: Feature 3 - The Number of Services Purchased By An Account; Reprinted
from [92]
It is a common feature in many online social networks that an user can upgrade his/her
account by making a certain amount of payment through various ways such as credit card,
wire transfer, and virtual currency. In the Tencent dataset, we consider 8 types of most
popular upgraded membership including QQ VIP, Qzone, SVIP, QQ Music, Hollywood
VIP, QQ Games, QQ books, and Tencent Sports. An upgraded account can a wide range of
paid benefits such as advanced capabilities for an online game avatar, enriched decoration
for the account appearance, and expanded visibility of visitors. While a certain amount of
benign users are inclined to be motivated to upgrade their accounts, accounts controlled
by attackers are extremely unlikely to participate in such paid upgrade since the upgraded
membership contributes nothing to their collection of virtual currency. Figure 4.6 presents
the distribution for this feature: while approximately 37% of benign users purchased at
least one type of upgraded membership, the vast majority of malicious accounts do not
make any purchase.
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Figure 4.7: Feature 4 - The Average Recharge Amount; Reprinted from [92]
4.3.2.2 Currency Collection Features
In addition to collecting virtual currency by participating in online promotion activities,
an OSN user can recharge her account with virtual currency through various ways such
as wire transfer, selling virtual goods, and transferring from other accounts. Generally,
benign users should be more active with respect to recharging their accounts. We propose
two features to characterize this trend from two aspects including the amount of recharging
and the important sources for recharging.
• Feature 4 - The Average Recharge Amount of Virtual Currency. This feature rep-
resents the average amount of virtual currency for each recharge regardless of the
sources for recharging.
Benign users who participate in online promotion activities are usually also interested
in other online financial activities. Therefore, these benign users tend to actively recharge
their accounts. The recharge amount for each time by a benign user is commonly consider-
ably large since users tend to decrease the hassle of recharging. In contrast, if a malicious
account has been recharged, the amount of virtual currency for each recharge is usually
bounded by a relatively small volume offered by the online promotion activity. Figure 4.7
presents the distribution of this feature for benign and malicious accounts, respectively.
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Figure 4.8: Feature 5 - The Percentage of Recharge from Promotion Activities; Reprinted
from [92]
Specifically, the average recharge amount is higher than 1100 Chinese cents1 for more than
50% of benign users, where only a small percentage (i.e., approximately 15%) of malicious
users has an average amount that is higher than 140 Chinese cents.
We then consider the sources for recharge. Despite a variety of possibilities, we focus
on one source that is rewards from promotion activities, and accordingly design one self-
explanatory feature as follows:
• Feature 5 : The Percentage of Recharge from Promotion Activities.
The feature intuitively profiles how significantly online promotion activities contribute
to the wealth of an account. Benign users are inclined to employ a variety of sources for
recharge. Comparatively, malicious accounts usually exclusively rely on online promotion
activities to collect virtual currency. Figure 4.8 presents the distribution of this feature.
Both the majority (approximate 88%) of benign and malicious accounts have not collected
any virtual currency from promotion activities. In spite of the similarity, malicious ac-
counts differentiate themselves from benign ones by experiencing a strong bipolar distri-
bution: approximate 88% of malicious accounts do not collect virtual currency from online
promotion activities at all where as the remaining (i.e., approximate 12%) accumulate their
1Each Chinese cent is approximately 16 of a U.S. cent
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wealth exclusively from online promotion activities; the number of malicious accounts,
whose currency is partially collected from online promotion activities, is negligible. This
implies that it is the first time for about 88% of malicious accounts to participate in online
promotion events where 12% are reused accounts.
4.3.2.3 Features of Usage Activities
As an increasing number of business capabilities are integrated into social networks, users
conduct a variety of activities such as shopping and gifting. Features in this category char-
acterize how users spend their wealth. As a means towards this end, we propose three
features.
• Feature 6 : The Total Amount of Expenditure.
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Figure 4.9: Feature 6 - The Total Amount of Expenditure; Reprinted from [92]
This feature characterizes the total amount of expenditure of an account regardless of
the possible sources such as the associated bank accounts, the virtual currency, and other
online social network platforms. As the popular online social networks are integrated into
almost all mainstream e-business infrastructures, shopping and gifting through these ac-
counts becomes prevalent. Users keep recharging their accounts, persistently associate their
bank accounts with OSN accounts, and actively engage in shopping and gifting. Therefore,
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we expect that benign accounts accumulate a high amount of expenditure. Comparatively,
the total amount of currency controlled by each malicious account is constrained by the
total number of virtual currency collected from online promotions, which is expected to be
relatively small. Figure 4.9 presents the distribution of this feature. At least 50% of benign
accounts have spent more than 4000 Chinese cents. Comparatively, only a tiny percent-
age of 0.9% malicious accounts spent more than 4000 Chinese cent; the vast majority of
malicious accounts never committed any spending.
• Feature 7: The Percentage of Expenditure from Banks.
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Figure 4.10: Feature 7 - The Percentage of Expenditure from Banks; Reprinted from [92]
As we have introduced, a user can associate her bank account with the OSN account.
This bank account can be directly used for shopping and gifting in addition to recharging
the OSN account with virtual currency. Such association may greatly facilitate financial
activities but result in exposure of users’ bank identities in case of law enforcement. Fig-
ure 4.10 presents the evaluation of this feature based on the real-world data. A very tiny
percentage of malicious accounts expended their currency from bank accounts. Compara-
tively, this percentage is considerably high for benign users (i.e., around 45%).
• Feature 8: The Percentage of Expenditure as Gifts.
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After malicious accounts collect virtual currency from the online promotion activities,
they will transfer it to malicious accounts used for trading. Sending online gift cards be-
comes the best option for malicious accounts to transfer currency for two reasons. First,
sending online gift cards inside an OSN usually does not incur any cost. Second, such
transfer is independent to any bank, thereby requiring no personal information and conse-
quently minimizing the exposure of attackers. We therefore design this feature to quantify
the percentage of all expenditure that is used for gifts. Figure 4.11 presents the empirical
analysis of this feature. Specifically, malicious accounts show a strong pattern of bipo-
lar distribution. Particularly, approximate 81% of malicious accounts never sent any gifts.
Most likely, these accounts have never successfully participated any promotion activities
and therefore have nothing to transfer. The rest of them (i.e., about 19%) spend all of their
expenditure on gifts, which implies that they transfer all of their wealth to other accounts.
Similar to malicious accounts, most of benign accounts (i.e., about 80%) never engaged
in any gifting activities. However, the remaining benign accounts (i.e., about 20%) seem
reluctant to use all of their wealth as gift.
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Figure 4.11: Feature 8 - The Percentage of Expenditure as Gifts; Reprinted from [92]
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4.4 Evaluation
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted an extensive evaluation of ProGuardthat focused on overall detection ac-
curacy, feature importance, and the correlation between these features. In total, we used
56,000 samples that featured 28,000 malicious accounts and 28,000 benign accounts; this
well-balanced dataset served well for training a statistical classifier [2].
4.4.2 Experimental Results
4.4.2.1 Detection Accuracy
We evaluated ProGuard’s detection capabilities using the normalized random forest (RF)
method, which uses multiple unpruned classification trees that use normalized bootstrapped
trees from the original samples for the training set; in this method, the classification is
chosen by the majority voting over all the trees in the random forest. We used the RF
method [9] as a binary classification method for evaluating the accuracy of malicious ac-
count detection. We also performed 10-fold cross-validation, a model validation technique
that assesses the generalization of the trained RF classifier to the original dataset. Specif-
ically, we divided the entire dataset into 10 equal-sized subsets (i.e., 10 non-overlapping
partitions) and iteratively assigned nine non-overlapping partitions to training and the re-
maining single non-overlapping partition to testing. To ensure the best classification model,
the RF classifier was tuned by 3,000 trees to grow, and four features were randomly sam-
pled for each tree splitting [45]. We selected the ROC curve, which is a plot between a
true-positive rate and false-positive rate, to demonstrate ProGuard’s overall detection per-
formance. Fig. 4.12 shows that the proposed eight features used by ProGuard achieved
high detection accuracy in malicious detection in cases where they were integrated by the
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RF classifier. For instance, ProGuard achieved a high detection rate of 96.67% with a low
false-positive rate of 0.3%.
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Figure 4.12: ROC curve on the proposed 8 features; Reprinted from [92]
In addition, regarding the proposed detection features, it is practically important to
study the performance of alternative classification methods. Therefore, we also evaluated
ProGuard’s sensitivity to traditional statistical classifiers, such as the support vector ma-
chine (SVM) [17] and gradient-boosted tree [31] classifiers. Specifically, we used 10-fold
cross-validation on each classifier and compared the area under the ROC curve (AUC) [26],
as this area is equal to the probability that a randomly chosen sample of malicious accounts
will have a higher estimated probability of belonging to malicious accounts than a ran-
domly chosen sample of benign accounts; this is a widely-used method for measuring the
quality of supervised classification models. Since AUC is cutoff-independent and AUC
values range from 0.5 (i.e., no predictive ability) to 1.0 (i.e., perfect predictive ability),
the classifier with the highest AUC indicates better prediction performance, regardless of
the cutoff selection. Table 4.1 represents the summary information on AUC values for the
classifiers selected in the experiments. Both the SVM and gradient-boosted tree classifiers
achieved fairly good detection results that were comparable with the RF classifier, though
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the RF classifier had the best performance overall regarding AUC. These experimental re-
sults revealed that our detection features are robust regardless of the selected statistical
classifiers.
Table 4.1: AUCs for Three Classifiers; Reprinted from [92]
Classifier AUC
Random Forest 0.9959
SVM 0.9753
Gradient-Boosted Tree 0.9781
4.4.2.2 Feature Importance and Correlation
Overall, these top three features which include Feature 1 (The Ratio of Active Days), Fea-
ture 4 (The Average Recharge Amount of Virtual Currency), and Feature 7 (The Percentage
of Expenditure from Banks) tend to complement each other in terms of our feature design
which covers General Behaviors, Currency Collection, and Currency Usage.
We also performed feature importance analysis to evaluate the detection capabilities
of each of ProGuard’s proposed features. Since RF outperformed the other classification
methods in Table 4.1 and can reasonably model the relationship between features and OSN
accounts, we applied each features variable importance to the RF classification model using
permutation test [45]. The values of variable importance were computed using the mean
decrease in accuracy, which was defined as a prediction error rate after permuting each
feature [45]. The rank of features based on their variable importance is shown in Table 4.2.
Specifically, the ratio of active days (Feature 1) and the average recharge amount of virtual
currency (Feature 4) represent the most significant features for detection. Overall, the top
three features: Feature 1 (The Ratio of Active Days), Feature 4 (The Average Recharge
Amount of Virtual Currency), and Feature 7 (The Percentage of Expenditure from Banks)
tended to complement each other in terms of our feature designs, which cover general
behaviors, currency collection, and currency usage.
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Table 4.2: Feature importance rank of ProGuard by Random Forest; Reprinted from [92]
Rank Variable importance
Feature 1 465.4
Feature 4 349.9
Feature 7 246.6
Feature 2 61.31
Feature 5 56.91
Feature 8 52.17
Feature 6 46.44
Feature 3 35.63
We also evaluated the correlation among various features, where correlation implies
the extent to which a feature might be redundant given other features. We adopted two
strategies in our experiments. First, we used the correlation matrix to identify whether
correlated predictors exist in the features, where each element in the upper triangular matrix
represented the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient [44] of two features. The Pearson’s
correlation coefficient r ∈ [−1, 1] of two features, X and Y , can be defined as
r =
∑
(X − X̄)(Y − Ȳ )√∑
(X − X̄)2
√∑
(Y − Ȳ )2
(4.1)
where X̄ and Ȳ denote the means of the two features. Fig. 4.13 shows that the ma-
jority of features have a weak linear correlation to other features. For example, a pair of
features, Feature 1 (The Ratio of Active Days) and Feature 8 (The Percentage of Expenditure
as Gifts), represented the highest negative correlation score at 0.07. The highest positive
correlation between Feature 4 (The Average Recharge Amount of Virtual Currency) and
Feature 6 (The Total Amount of Expenditure) was 0.82.
Second, we performed principal component analysis (PCA), which is used to analyze
the correlation between variables with respect to the data variance [37]. We presented our
evaluation results using the PCA variable factor map [64] in Figure 4.14. In a factor map,
an arrow represents a feature. The angle between the two feature arrows explains the cor-
relation between the respective features of the two principal components. Specifically, if
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Figure 4.13: Upper triangular matrix; Reprinted from [92]
the angle between the two arrows is close to 90 degrees, the corresponding features are
not correlated. As illustrated in Figure 4.14, the angles between the majority of features
were approximately 90 degrees (e.g., Feature 3 (The Number of Services Purchased By
An Account) and Feature 5 (The Percentage of Recharge from Promotion Activities) onto
the third and fourth principal components), implying a weak correlation between features.
According to the correlation matrix and PCA variable factor map, which show little corre-
lation, we concluded that most of the features complement each other based on their linear
independence.
4.5 Discussion
Attackers who create multiple malicious OSN accounts intend to evade our detection ef-
forts once they comprehend the ProGuard’s framework. This phenomenon is not a sys-
tematic flaw specific to the proposed detection technique but a typical challenge for all
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Figure 4.14: The variables factor map (PCA); Reprinted from [92]
detection systems. Specifically, attackers can instrument their malicious OSN accounts,
and consequently, in effect, their behavioral patterns cannot be differentiated from benign
OSN accounts. However, since ProGuard’s detection features target the characteristics of
malicious accounts that play a key role in the success of their attacks and their stealthi-
ness against other detection efforts, the attackers’ successful evasion could essentially limit
their malicious capabilities. For example, attackers can intentionally increase the num-
ber of active days in malicious accounts. However, this reveals their malicious accounts
to existing bot-account detection systems that utilize frequent login patterns to identify
malicious accounts [91]. In addition, attackers can significantly increase their number of
friends by adding their other malicious accounts as friends. However, this can be detected
by many systems that leverage social structures, such as [72, 88, 56]. Attackers can also use
diverse methods to recharge their resources, recharge amounts, and bank account expen-
diture amounts. Nevertheless, their attempts directly increase the financial cost associated
with laundering the attacks, which may render the attacks themselves useless. Moreover,
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attackers could try to reduce the percentage of expenditures through online gifting, but this
fundamentally constrains their bandwidth to launder the virtual currency collected from
online promotion events.
It is possible that attackers can hack some benign users’ accounts and leverage these
benign accounts to participate in online promotion events. However, it is worth noting
that hacking a large number of benign accounts is a nontrivial task that requires significant
costs. Moreover, the majority of social networks have generally provided efficient recovery
options to protect hacked accounts. Nonetheless, attackers can create a significant number
of free OSN accounts dedicated to persistent malicious activities. Overall, this reduces
attackers’ motivation to employ hacked benign accounts for this type of attack. However,
if attackers indeed attempt to use the hacked accounts for such attacks, these accounts
may demonstrate both benign and malicious behavior. In this scenario, if the malicious
behaviors are dominant in the OSN dataset (i.e., the online financial activities from benign
accounts are trivial), then we expect that our system will still perform well in detecting
these accounts. On the contrary, if benign behaviors dominate (i.e., these accounts are
considerably active in online financial activities), then the accounts are likely to yield a
false negative. Addressing false negatives in this scenario is an important problem, and our
future work will look for efficient solutions.
Considering the active trend of integrating financial capabilities into OSNs, the ability
to detect malicious accounts that engage in suspicious financial activity is centrally impor-
tant. Although the ProGuard’s design and evaluation are based on real-world data collected
from Tencent QQ, a leading Chinese OSN with 899 million active accounts, its features and
detection framework can be easily applied to other OSNs that integrate financial activities.
Specifically, all the proposed features are based on essential financial functions, such as
recharging and gifting. In addition, all current features rely on coarse-grained information
that minimizes privacy concerns, which may foster the deployment of the proposed system
in a detection-as-service model.
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Since integrating OSNs with financial capabilities is active trend in online business,
the efforts to detect malicious accounts, which interacts with suspicious financial activities
is becoming more importance. Even if the design and evaluation of ProGuard are orig-
inated from real-world dataset collected from Tencent QQ, a leading Chinese OSN with
899 million active accounts, the proposed features and the detection framework can be
easily fitted to other mainstream OSNs that integrate financial activities. Particularly, our
proposed features are designed on the basis on fundamental financial functions such as
recharging and gifting. Furthermore, all the features depend on coarse-grained information
that minimizes the OSN users’ privacy issue, which could develop the real deployment
of our ProGuard system in a detection-as-service model. In spite of the fact that Pro-
Guard system can efficiently detect malicious accounts employed for collecting virtual
currency via online promotion events, the current implementation of our system has the
limitation to detect malicious accounts used in transferring and laundering steps. There-
fore, extending ProGuard to handle such malicious detection capabilities is considered as
our future work.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presents ProGuard, a novel system that can automatically detect malicious ac-
counts that participate in online promotion events on social networks. ProGuard’s features
use three aspects to characterize malicious OSN accounts: general behavior, currency col-
lection, and currency usage. Applied to a real OSN dataset collected from Tencent QQ, a
global leading Chinese OSN company, ProGuard achieved a high detection rate of 96.67%
and an extremely low false-positive rate of 0.3%, indicating that the system has value for
real deployment.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The Internet is a popular platform for communication and information sharing. However,
since the Internet inevitably poses security risks for end-users and network services, data-
driven network-centric threat assessment is of the utmost importance. Many such threat
assessment systems have been proposed. Yet, these threat assessment systems face three
challenges that can reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of their practical deployment.
First, attackers display a diverse range of behaviors in launching threats in order to in-
crease their effectiveness, as existing threat assessment systems rely on static patterns to
detect threats. Second, regarding network-centric threats, the heterogeneity of the data used
is fundamentally significant, as the assessment systems rely on the systematic characteri-
zation of this data to assess threats. Third, the volume of data in network-centric systems
is rapidly growing, and this growth requires threat assessment systems to operate on a
distributed architecture in the cloud computing environment in order to circumvent their
scalability limitations. This research aims to address these three challenges by designing
three new threat assessment systems.
In the first phase of our dissertation work, we designed DNSMiner [39], a novel system
that identifies the presence of network users using DNS behavioral tracking, which is one
of the most important methods for addressing privacy concerns within the Domain Name
System (DNS). DNSMiner improves the effectiveness and scalability of existing user iden-
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tification systems by automatically deriving DNS-based fingerprints, which can reveal the
users’ unique DNS activities. In building this system, we made the following contributions:
• We proposed five new patterns to accurately characterize network users’ DNS behav-
iors using their DNS queries.
• We built a scalable MapReduce framework to automatically generate DNS finger-
prints from a large DNS dataset.
• To demonstrate the effectiveness of the DNSMiner system for practical deployment,
we present an extensive evaluation strategy using a real DNS dataset from an on-
campus network.
The second phase of our dissertation work focuses on developing DART [38], a new
system that detects fake antivirus webpages. This system boosts the effectiveness of exist-
ing detection methods by applying multifaceted features that are extracted from the seman-
tic analysis of diverse trendy security keywords and the characteristics of their malicious
networking infrastructure. Through this work, we made the following contributions:
• We built a novel machine learning-based detection system that can effectively detect
fake antivirus webpages before the end-user’s system is fully infected.
• We designed diverse detection patterns that systematically capture the essential in-
variance of fake antivirus webpages, specifically regarding three aspects, including
human-perception behavior, search engine optimization, and networking infrastruc-
ture.
• We evaluated the DART system’s effectiveness using actual fake antivirus webpages
on the Internet, which revealed the system’s high detection accuracy and extremely
low false-positive rate.
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In the third phase of our dissertation work, we developed ProGuard [92], a novel de-
tection system that identifies malicious accounts that participate in social network-based
promotion events. ProGuard can proactively detect malicious OSN accounts before the
reward is completed. In addition, our detection system can improve the effectiveness of ex-
isting detection systems that target only spam or financial fraud. By designing the system,
we offer the following contributions:
• We designed a detection system that is capable of identifying malicious OSN ac-
counts used for online promotion events during the virtual currency collection phase.
• We proposed eight novel features that characterize how malicious OSN accounts
behave using three factors: general profile, virtual currency collection, and virtual
currency usage.
• We developed an automatic detection system based on supervised learning algo-
rithms and evaluated the effectiveness of our system using a real OSN dataset.
5.2 Future Work
In addition to addressing centrally important research challenges for building effective and
scalable network-centric threat assessment systems, we present the following avenues for
future research.
• DNS Session-based Fingerprinting for Short-Term Network User Identification
As discussed in Chapter 2, we developed a DNSMiner system that can automatically
derive users’ behavioral fingerprints from large-scale DNS queries (i.e., that can pas-
sively collect DNS traces). This system uses these behavioral fingerprints to iden-
tify the presence of unknown users in new DNS streams. The experimental results
demonstrate that the system has high detection accuracy in deanonymizing network
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users’ presence. However, currently, the implementation of DNSMiner focuses only
on network users that are persistently active for at least four days out of the past seven
days. As such, the design is limited in its ability to detect networks users engaging
in short-term DNS activities. Tracking these users’ behaviors is challenging, as ex-
tracting the periodic DNS fingerprints of short-term active users is difficult. Hence,
to improve the practical usage of the system for detecting users engaging in tran-
sient DNS activities, we will study the characteristics of these users’ behavior-based
tracking between multiple gap-sessions based on the observed DNS queries during a
short period (e.g., one day or three days) and leverage machine learning and natural
language processing (NLP) techniques to achieve better accuracy in identifying these
users in the future.
• Fake Antivirus Webpages Detection System in a Distributed Architecture
Due to the nature of social engineering attacks in malware distribution, attackers are
more likely to launch a large number of fake antivirus webpages, resulting in an
important challenge regarding the DART system’s scalability (see Chapter 3). To en-
hance the systems scalability, future research could design a distributed infrastructure
that can be implemented in cloud computing environment (e.g., Hadoop or Spark)
• Detecting Malicious OSN Accounts during Multi-Layer Transferring or Laun-
dering Phases
Currently, the ProGuard system can efficiently detect malicious OSN accounts as
they collect virtual currency. However, to evade detection systems, attackers actively
extend the resilience of their malicious infrastructure using obfuscation methods.
For example, it is possible that attackers hack accounts benignly to circumvent the
ProGuard system’s detection capabilities, as benignly hacked accounts would appear
as normal, unhacked accounts. We plan to address this important challenge in our
future work by investigating malicious OSN accounts that are used for transferring
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and laundering.
5.3 Closing Remarks
In our dissertation work, we have addressed significant research challenges in network-
centric threat assessment. Specifically, we focused on new three challenges that existing
network-centric threat assessment systems must overcome: behavioral diversity, data het-
erogeneity, and large-volume data. First, we proposed a novel threat assessment system
that can identify network users using DNS behavioral-based tracking and, as a result, dis-
close the DNS information leakage of end-users against privacy threats. Second, we built
a new system for detecting fake antivirus webpages, an active trend in malware distribu-
tion. Finally, we presented a systematic framework that can detect malicious OSN accounts
used to launder virtual currency through online promotion events. Together, these contribu-
tions can improve the effectiveness and scalability of existing threat assessment methods.
Since network-centric threats are continuously evolving, we are confident that the solutions
proposed in this dissertation will contribute to future research on network-centric threat as-
sessment.
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